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I. INTRODUCTION
N important policy debate is emerging in American estates
law concerning how the law of succession should change to
encapsulate more fully the evolving notions of Ameri-
can families. Changing family structures' and emerging technolo-
1. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (The United States Supreme Court,
acknowledging this social change, stated that "[t]he demographic changes of the past cen-
tury make it difficult to speak of an average American family."); WILLIAM M. McGOVERN
& SHELDON F. KURTZ, CONCISE HANDBOOK: PRINCIPLES OF WILLS, TRUSqs & ESTATES
49 (2005) (referring to the Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002, No. 74 in that
one in every three babies are of non-marital mothers); Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property
of Death, 60 U. PIrr. L. REV. 971, 1004 (1999) ("Only one in four families conforms to the
idea of the traditional nuclear [family]."); Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death:
Inheritance Consequences of Reproductive Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1091, 1101-
02 (1996) (indicating that the nuclear family is not one which is heavily represented among
families anymore and attributing the change to increases in divorce, second marriages, and
a greater social acceptance of cohabitation and single people raising children); Maya Bell,
'Gayby Boom' Shows No Sign of Slowing: More Gays and Lesbians Than Ever Are Becom-
ing Parents, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 28, 2003, at Al (quoting April Martin as saying that
what was a "sizeable boom" in the 1990s has become a "groundswell"); Betsy Hammond,
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gies2 influence the definition of "parentage" in law and society. These
influences undermine the traditional definition of a parent-child relation-
ship-the presence or presumption of a genetic link between two individ-
uals. Recognition of parent-child status is of particular concern for
estates law in determining distributions to "children" for intestacy and
testacy purposes. The problem arises because of state estates law's con-
tinued reliance on the sanguinary nexus test (determinations based upon
ties of "blood") as (i) the dominant criterion for intestacy preference as-
sumptions (determining whether an individual has a right to take prop-
erty when a "parent" dies without a will), and (ii) the standard for class
gift terminology under a will or other dispositive instrument.
From an estates law perspective, the sanguinary nexus test has become
an increasingly frustrating, and arguably arcane, legal tool in light of the
diversity of family relationships extant in American life. Considering the
evolving notions of family structures and advances in reproductive and
genetic technologies involving cloning, surrogacy, egg/sperm donation,
and genetic mapping, serious questions arise about whether a sanguinary
nexus test can produce results consistent with the fundamental principles
of estates law. As one commentator noted, reliance on a sanguinary rela-
tionship for property succession purposes "may be underinclusive be-
cause it excludes many currently existing family groups ... [and] may be
overinclusive because legal ties do not necessarily create familial ties." '3
While notions of what constitutes a family are evolving alongside ad-
vances in reproductive technology, states are "approaching [these] space
age technolog[ies] with Model-T statutes and cases."'4 For example,
should each offspring of an active sperm donor, most likely wholly un-
known to that donor, take a child's share of the donor's intestate estate if
the donor dies without a will? Would a biological clone qualify as a child
of the genetic material donor or the parents of the genetic material donor
to whom the clone has a direct genetic link? If a child's genetic donors
are of the same sex, 5 does the sanguinary nexus test provide an adequate
guide to that child's inheritance claims if the genetic parents die without
wills? Should a child raised and supported by a perceived genetic father
who actually had no genetic link to the child nevertheless take a child's
share of the decedent's estate? These examples involving cutting-edge
reproductive and genetic technology highlight the fact that the sanguinary
nexus test is fast becoming too brittle.
The 2000 Census: More Say "I Do" to Cohabitation, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, June 6, 2001,
at Al (reporting that 9% of all couples declared themselves "unmarried couples").
2. See infra Part IV, discussing various methods of assisted reproductive technologies.
3. Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INE-
QUALITY 1, 41 (2000).
4. David Margolick, Legal Rights of Embryos, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1984, at A12
(citing Lori B. Andrews concerning infertility cases and the law) (internal quotations
omitted).
5. Robin McKie & Anushka Asthana, Two Men and Their Baby-How Science Out-
wits Mother Nature, THE GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 13, 2005, available at http://www.
guardian.co.uklscience/2005/now/13/genetics.research.
20091
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The question remains though, that if the sanguinary nexus test has be-
come outdated, how should a parent-child relationship be expanded or
redefined for the purposes of the law of succession? The answer to this
question depends upon which overarching principle is used as the guiding
principle in defining a parent-child relationship for property succession
purposes-family law jurisprudence or property law jurisprudence. In
other words, if necessary, whose interests should take priority in making
parent-child determinations for property succession purposes-those of
the property owner or those of the child?
To date, family law and family courts have been at the forefront of
discussions concerning parent-child relationships. Family law has already
looked at different concepts of parentage: biological, legal, and functional
parenting, to name a few. It should not be surprising then, that estates
law scholars have tended to look to family law scholarship for guidance
and family court parental-obligation decisions as a definitive factor in de-
termining a parent-child relationship for the laws of succession. 6 Thus, it
is not surprising that the bulk of estates law scholarship concerning the
definition of a parent-child relationship for property succession purposes
is solely rooted in family law jurisprudence, not property law.
When the overlap and disconnect between family law and estates law
jurisprudence is viewed through the lens of the law of parent-child prop-
erty succession, however, the serious flaws in estates law's emphasis on
family law come into focus. The concepts and theories developed under
family law concerning parent-child relationships may provide guidance to
estates law, but should not be determinative in the law of succession be-
cause the jurisprudential underpinnings of family law conflict with those
of the law of succession. Estates law and family law have very different
goals in defining a parent-child relationship. Many salient concerns re-
garding various issues evoked from a parent-child relationship during the
parties' lifetime are not necessarily relevant to issues concerning the dis-
tribution of one's estate.
Generally, family law is child-centered 7 and ultimately concerned with
the best interest of the child, from support to guardianship. Thus, in the
area of assisted reproductive technology (ART), for example, contempo-
rary parentage law offers two general themes to guide policymaking: chil-
6. As a general rule, in cases where a family court deems a parent to have support
obligations, the relationship between the obligated parent and child will also be deemed to
qualify the child under the sanguinary nexus test for inheritance purposes. See Ralph C.
Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 93,
116 (stating that while "inheritance rights are dependent upon the determination of parent-
age, succession laws have no direct role in ameliorating the flaws and inconsistencies asso-
ciated with inter vivos paternity proceedings").
7. For examples of child-centered perspectives on parental rights, see Katharine T.
Barlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988); James G. Dwyer, Parents'
Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L.
REV. 1371 (1994); Elizabeth S. Scott and Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2401 (1995); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Per-
spective on Parents Rights, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 1747 (1993).
[Vol. 62
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dren's interests come first, and two-parent care is generally preferable to
that of single parent care.
8
In contrast, the underlying principal of estates law is not the best inter-
est of the child-it is testamentary freedom. 9 Although testamentary
freedom and the furtherance of the testator's intent involve evolving no-
tions of family, the perspective of parentage in estates law should be
property owner-centered, not child-centered. Family law simply has not
"favor[ed] the fulfillment of individual purposes and the amplification of
individual choice." 10 In fact, it seems counterintuitive to focus on the
child's perspective in a system where a property owner can simply disin-
herit a child. 1 Therefore, the goals of family law and family courts in
determining parent-child relationships are very different from estates
law's goals.
The problem with estates law scholars looking to family law to define
the parent-child relationship is that these scholars not only tend to bor-
row the concepts; they borrow the mantra of the child-centered theology
as well. Despite the abundance of literature on this issue, existing policy
8. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to
the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835 (2000); Nancy Polikoff,
Breaking the Link Between Biology and Parental Rights in Planned Lesbian Families:
When Semen Donors Are Not Fathers, 2 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 57, 57 (2001); Naomi Cahn,
Parenthood, Genes, and Gametes: The Family Law and Trusts and Estates Perspectives, 32
U. MEM. L. R. 563 (2002); [hereinafter Cahn, Parenthood, Genes, and Gametes]; Naomi
Cahn, Refraining Child Custody Decsionmaking, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1997) [hereinafter
Cahn, Refraining Child Custody].
9. It is generally held that the overarching jurisprudential foundation of American
estates law is testamentary freedom. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS &
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a (2003) ("The organizing principle of the
American law of donative transfers is freedom of disposition."); VALERIE J. VOLLMAR ET
AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO TRUSTS & ESTATES 21 (2003) ("Perhaps the most fundamental
principle reflected in the American law of wealth transmission is freedom of testation ....
"); LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 7 (3d ed. 2002) ("Freedom of disposition is the
hallmark of the American law of succession."); Ronald Chester, Inheritance in American
Legal Thought, in INHERITANCE AND WEALTH IN AMERICA 23, 23-32 (Robert K. Miller, Jr.
& Stephen J. McNamee eds., 1988) (stating that testamentary "freedom has a strong cul-
tural tradition in Anglo-American law"); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession
in Social Perspective, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN
ASSEMBLY REPORT 9, 14 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977) ("It is often said that the
principle of freedom of testation dominates the law of the United States."); Lee-ford Tritt,
Liberating Estates Law from the Constraints of Copyright, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 109,111 (2006)
("Testamentary freedom .. is the hallmark principle of estates law."); see also infra Part
II.A and accompanying notes for further discussion of testamentary freedom.
10. Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood:
An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 297, 327 (2006).
11. Under American law, parents can disinherit their children-even if minor or dis-
abled-without cause or remedy. Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance
Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 220 (2001). Louisiana is the only state that protects children
from intentional disinheritance. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 466 (7th ed. 2005) ("In all states except Louisiana, a child or other
descendant has no statutory protection against disinheritance by a parent."). Louisiana
provides a forced share for children who are twenty-three years or younger or who are
under a mental incapacity or physical infirmity and are permanently incapable of taking
care of their persons or administering their estates. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 1493(A)
(2008).
2009]
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analyses simply fail to challenge estates law's deference to family law.
There is no better example of this acquiescence to family law dogma than
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws' very
recent amendments to the Uniform Probate Code's (UPC)12 definition of
parent-child relationship for property succession purposes. 13 Rather than
abandoning the outdated sanguinary nexus test, the 2008 UPC Amend-
ments retain this relic and slap band-aids on it (or new frameworks) to
account for a few specific and selective relationships that fall outside of
the traditional genetic definition, such as adopted children and children
born of certain ART. While the drafters of the 2008 UPC Amendments
have taken a step in the right direction, the complicated and ideologically
inconsistent definitional additions to and exclusions from the sanguinary
nexus test are inherently flawed in that they borrow heavily from family
law concepts without refocusing these concepts to a property law per-
spective. This new and complicated rubric is unnecessary; the adoption of
a purely functionally based approach to the definition of a parent-child
relationship would best honor the fundamental policy rationales behind
estates law.
Therefore, this Article proposes a new model of analyzing legal issues
arising from the evolving notions of parentage in America and uses it to
develop rules to govern the definition of parentage for succession law
purposes while preserving testamentary freedom. To bring estates law
back into step with modern family realities, this Article posits that an
unadulterated functionally based approach should replace both the san-
guinary nexus analytical framework and the recently adopted 2008 UPC
Amendments approach. This unadulterated functionally based approach
would be the only framework to determine a parent-child relationship-
there would be no need for multiple frameworks-one for children born
from sexual conception, one for children born of technological concep-
tion, and one for adopted children. Because succession laws look to fa-
milial relations only as an approximation of testamentary intent, the
proposed framework in this Article focuses on the rights and best inter-
ests of the decedent only; in so doing, it often departs from analysis in
other parent-child influenced case law where the focus-appropriately
enough for other areas of family law, but not for estates law's approxima-
tion of testamentary intent-has primarily been on the rights and best
interests of the child.
12. The model American law governing the transfer of property at death is the Uni-
form Probate Code (UPC). Article II of the UPC was first promulgated in 1969 and was
extensively revised in 1990. This Article lays out the law of intestate succession, as well as
substantive rules covering the execution and revocation of wills and certain other non-
probate instruments.
13. After acceptance of this Article for publication, but prior to publication, the UPC
was amended to reflect changes in defining parent-child relationships for purposes of prop-
erty succession. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-104, 2-114-122 (2000) [hereinafter 2008 UPC
Amendments]. This Article has been updated to reflect these changes and the pertinent
2008 UPC Amendments are discussed in Part VI.
[Vol. 62
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To accomplish this goal, this Article uses parental support cases as a
springboard for criticism of the current approach. As mentioned earlier,
in cases where a family court deems a parent to have support obligations,
the relationship between the obligated parent and child will also be
deemed to qualify the child under the sanguinary nexus test for inheri-
tance rights if the obligated parent died intestate. Surveying a variety of
parental support cases involving novel family situations, this Article de-
ploys a normative and pragmatic critique of estates law's reliance upon
family law principles to determine relevant family relationships. From a
normative standpoint, a close examination of parental support cases
reveals how reliance upon family law principles undermines the integrity
of testamentary freedom. Paradoxically, that potential attack on testa-
mentary freedom has rather serious deleterious implications for effective
family planning in modern society. From a pragmatic standpoint, the
work demonstrates the growing impracticability of attending adequately
to inheritance rights that arise from continued reliance on family law
principles. This Article then articulates and defends an unadulterated
functional approach to defining a parent-child relationship that would
completely break genetic links (and legal parental determinations) for in-
heritance purposes. This Article concludes that paying greater fidelity to
a wholly functionally based framework, rather than reliance upon blood
relationships or family law jurisprudence, would help rehabilitate the
core value of testamentary freedom in estates law.
To describe fully the unadulterated functionally based approach to de-
fining the parent-child relationship for inheritance purposes, this Article
will address the philosophical foundations of estates law and family law,
as well as the doctrinal developments in each that have given rise to the
current conflict. Accordingly, Part II, "Foundation Underpinnings of
Pertinent Legal Disciplines," introduces the doctrine of testamentary
freedom for estates law purposes and explores the jurisprudence of fam-
ily law in general. Part III, "Current State of Relevant Property Succes-
sion Law," examines the various succession laws impacted by the debate
concerning the definition of a parent-child relationship. Part IV, "Parent
Making: The Processes and Problems," describes the various technologi-
cal advances in child creation and genetic testing that are influencing the
notion of family structures, while highlighting the inadequacies of the
sanguinary nexus test. Part V, "Case Analyses," uses parental support
cases for evaluating the desirability of family law's potential influence on
inheritance law. Part VI, "Defining the Parent-Child Status," reviews va-
rious frameworks for defining the parent-child relationship, including the
2008 UPC Amendments, and proposes and explores the unadulterated
functionally based approach as the sole framework to solve the various
issues arising for the changing structures of the American family. Part
VII, "Potential Criticisms of Unadulterated Functionally Based Ap-
proach," evaluates the potential shortfalls of the unadulterated function-
ally based approach to defining the parent-child relationship for
inheritance purposes. Finally, Part VIII reiterates the need to amend suc-
2009]
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cession law to encapsulate more fully the evolving notion of parent-child
relationships and advocates the adoption of the unadulterated function-
ally based approach to alleviate the concerns raised by the current reli-
ance of the sanguinary nexus test.
II. FOUNDATIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF PERTINENT
LEGAL DISCIPLINES
A. PROPERTY SUCCESSION LAW
A substantive analysis of the definition of parent-child status for inheri-
tance purposes must begin with an elementary overview of the traditional
philosophical justifications for, and limitations upon, testamentary free-
dom-the basic estates law principle at stake in this conflict. An appreci-
ation of the jurisprudential underpinnings of testamentary freedom is
necessary because reliance upon the sanguinary nexus test can potentially
thwart an individual's desire concerning the distribution of his or her
estate.
The principle of testamentary freedom, the governing principle under-
lying American estates law,14 provides that individuals have the freedom
(or right) to control the disposition of their property at death.' 5 From
this follows the generally accepted principle that "succession law should
reflect the desires of the 'typical person,' both with regard to protecting
expressions of desire and anticipating situations where those expressions
are inadequately presented.' a6
14. See sources cited supra note 9. However, some scholars are skeptical concerning
the actual deference paid to testamentary freedom in American estates law because of the
potentially biased results of postmortem will contests. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, The
Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 235, 243-68 (1996) (theorizing that courts
validate wills on the basis of whether the testator bequeathed his or her property to his or
her biological family members rather than to non-relatives); see also Ray D. Madoff, Un-
masking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 576 (1997) (arguing that the "undue influ-
ence doctrine denies freedom of testation for people who deviate from judicially imposed
testamentary norms."). In addition to undue influence, some other legal doctrines poten-
tially check testamentary freedom as well. See Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for
Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 129, 142-44 (2008).
15. In theory, pure testamentary freedom places no limitations on how an individual
chooses to distribute his or her property at death. Even though testamentary freedom is
the underlying leading principle of Anglo-American estates law, complete testamentary
freedom is not a universally accepted principle. Almost all states place statutory limits on
the freedom of testation, though these limits are typically narrow and small in number. In
addition, these limitations do not, in any event, significantly curtail individual liberty and
are waivable. Although the statutes vary in considerable detail from state to state, the
UPC provisions are generally representative of the type of legislation found in most com-
mon law states. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (.000) (the surviving spouse's elective
share); UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-402, 2-402A (2000) (homestead allowance); UNIF. PRO-
BATE CODE §2-404 (2000) (maintenance allowance); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-403 (ex-
empt property allowances).
16. Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., An Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990 Uniform
Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 891, 912 (1992). Of course, there are other arguments for
supporting succession law, such as notions of support, reciprocity, social good, and social
engineering, to name a few.
[Vol. 62
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The importance of testamentary freedom should not be underesti-
mated. American society has long recognized the value inherent in pro-
tecting an individual's ability to acquire and transfer private property.
Testamentary freedom is derived from general and well-established prop-
erty law rights. Just as individuals have the right to accumulate, consume,
and transfer personal property during life, individuals generally are, and
should be, free to control the disposition of personal property at death.' 7
Thus, testamentary freedom can be viewed as one stick in the bundle of
rights referred to as property rights.' 8
Moreover, the principle of testamentary freedom is broader than a sim-
ple freedom to bequest one's property. In fact, testamentary freedom
encompasses several distinct but interconnected property rights: the right
to gift or devise property during life or at death, the right to choose who
receives such property, the right to place conditions on the donative
transfer, the right to choose the character and timing in and at which the
beneficiary receives the property, and the right to appoint another person
to make these choices. 19
Generally, there are three ways to manifest a testator's freedom or in-
tent in the disposition of property at death: 1) wills, 2) will-substitutes20
(for example, revocable inter vivos trusts, contracts, life insurance, pen-
sion plans, and joint accounts), and 3) intestacy statutes.2' While wills,
will-substitutes, and intestacy statutes differ in a variety of ways, they are
similar in that they each provide a means of effectuating the testator's
intent.
Rationales for testamentary freedom vary, and many theories have
been proffered in support for the principle of this theory-some widely
accepted, others more controversial. 22 In general, testamentary freedom
responds to basic human pleasures and desires and is supported by a vari-
ety of economic, philosophical, and societal values. The simplest ratio-
nale for testamentary freedom is that in a society based on the theory of
private property, the freedom of testation might be the least objectiona-
ble arrangement for dealing with property succession at the testator's
death. 23 Others argue that robust testamentary freedom is natural; cre-
ates happiness; promotes wealth accumulation and responsibility; encour-
ages industry, creativity, and productivity; reinforces family ties; and
17. Testamentary freedom extends the concept of absolute property ownership be-
yond the grave. See Tate, supra note 14, at 148.
18. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (stating that the right to transmit
wealth at death is a separate, identifiable stick in the bundle of rights called property).
19. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 9, at 7.
20. Basically, a will-substitute is the functional equivalent of a will executed during
life. Will-substitutes recognize testator's intent by including provisions that dispose of a
decedent's property at death according to his or her wishes.
21. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 11, at 62.
22. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead
Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 5-18 (1992) (discussing various arguments for testamentary freedom);
Tritt, supra note 9, at 115-39 (providing a detailed discussion on the scope and limitations
of testamentary freedom).
23. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 22, at 5.
2009]
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allows the testator to adapt to the needs and circumstances of his particu-
lar family.24 Each rationale has its proponents and skeptics, but the very
breadth of jurisprudential and pragmatic justifications for testamentary
freedom is, in itself, a testament to why this concept is at the core of
Anglo-American succession law.
B. FAMILY LAW
In contrast to probate law's normative focus on testator intent (or in
the context of intestacy, an approximation thereof), the focus of family
law, appropriately enough for that context, is generally child-centered.
25
This focus is best expressed by the "best interests of the child" principle
which pervades family law practice and guides (to varying degrees) deci-
sions, among others concerning legal parentage, custody, adoption, sup-
port, and visitation. 26
The present prominence of the best interests of the child standard in
family law is in large part an outgrowth of its use in resolving custody
disputes. 27 The best interests principle "is the sine qua non of the family
law process governing custody disputes," and where the dispute is be-
tween natural or adoptive parents, all states mandate custody placement
according to the best interests of the child.28 Likewise, the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act, designed to codify the existing law of most juris-
dictions, provides that "[t]he court shall determine custody in accordance
with the best interest of the child."'29 Despite the near universal accept-
ance of the best interest standard and its role as the dominant rule in
custody determinations, the standard has also been criticized for being
inherently indeterminate and for introducing too much judicial discre-
tion.30 Nonetheless, the best interests standard, often remedied in part by
24. See Tritt, supra note 9, at 117-30.
25. The history and evolution of American family law is beyond the scope of this
Article.
26. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 170 (8th ed. 2004); David D. Meyer, The Modest
Promise of Children's Relationship Rights, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1117, 1131-32
(2003); Amy Persin Linnert, Note, In the Best Interests of the Child: An Analysis of Wis-
consin Supreme Court Rulings Involving Same-Sex Couples with Children, 12 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 319, 320-23 (2001).
27. See Stephen G. Gilles, Parental (and Grandparental) Rights After Troxel v. Gran-
ville, 9 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 69, 96 (2001).
28. LINDA ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4:1 (2007).
29. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402 (1973). In determining the best interests
of the child, the Act directs courts to consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
Id. The Act further directs that courts "shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian
that does not affect his relationship to the child." Id.
30. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Status of Children: A Story of Emerging
Rights, in CROSS CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE U.S. AND ENGLAND 423,
433-34 (Sanford N. Katz et al. eds., 2000)
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legislative presumptions as to the placements that generally serve chil-
drens' best interests, has remained the overarching custody rule.31 Thus,
"[i]t is clear that the interests of the child now occupy the foreground of
custody law. The child is seen as the person most centrally concerned and
the person whose rights and liberties are most in play."'32
Like custody, adoption statutes are often driven by public policy con-
siderations as to the best interests of the child. 33 Indeed, the best interests
of the adopted child represent the "overriding consideration that must be
addressed in each adoption case," and a judicial determination that the
adoption is in the child's best interests is a prerequisite to placing a child
for adoption, terminating parental rights, granting a petition, or issuing a
final decree of adoption.34 Likewise, the Uniform Adoption Act is driven
by the "guiding principle" of "a desire to promote the welfare of children
"35
Visitation issues are also influenced by the best interests of the child
principle.36 Even when the principle gives way to other determinations,
the focus does not necessarily shift from the child's welfare or best inter-
ests. For example, in Troxel v. Granville,37 the Supreme Court struck
down a "breathtakingly broad" visitation statute that, based solely on a
judicial determination of the best interests of the child involved, allowed
a court to effectively ignore and overturn any visitation decision made by
a fit custodial parent whenever any third party affected by the decision
filed a petition for visitation. 38 Holding that the statute unconstitution-
ally infringed upon the "fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children," the plurality
of the Court, noting a "presumption that fit parents act in the best inter-
ests of their children," criticized the lack of deference given to a parental
determination that visitation was not in the best interests of the child:
"The problem here is not that the Washington Superior Court intervened,
but that when it did so, it gave no special weight at all to [the fit custodial
parent's] determination of her daughters' best interests. '39
Even if it is not the articulated standard, the best interests of the child
are also paramount in child support issues, where judicial decisions are
guided by the desire to assure adequate support for the child. Consider,
for example, the case of Straub v. B.M. T. by Todd.40 There, a man agreed
to "donate" sperm to a woman-not through a sperm bank, but rather
31. See id. at 435.
32. Id. at 436.
33. See Linnert, supra note 26, at 321.
34. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 131 (2008).
35. UNIF. ADOPrION Acr prefatory note (1994).
36. See Cynthia R. Mabry, "Who Is My Real Father?"-The Delicate Task of Identify-
ing a Father and Parenting Children Created from an In Vitro Mix-Up, 18 NAT'L BLACK L.J.
1, 21-22 (2004); Meyer, supra note 26, at 1131-32.
37. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
38. Id. at 67.
39. Id. at 66-69.
40. 645 N.E.2d 597 (Ind. 1994).
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through sexual intercourse-for the purpose of allowing her to conceive a
child.41 The woman signed an agreement that the man would not be re-
sponsible for child support in the event of conception, which the man
attempted to use as a defense when the woman eventually sought child
support for a child born of the agreement. 42 Noting the public policy
favoring the welfare of a child and the exclusive right of a child to receive
support, the court held the agreement to be void and unenforceable:
"Any agreement purporting to contract away these rights is directly con-
trary to this State's public policy of protecting the welfare of children, as
it narrows the basis for support to one parent. '43
Even with respect to purported inheritance questions, family law prin-
ciples have caused courts to focus on children. In In re Estate of Kolacy,44
the mother of two posthumously conceived children sought a declaration
that the children were the intestate heirs of their deceased father, a classi-
fication that would affect their ability to collect Social Security benefits.45
In recognizing the children as the legal heirs of their father, the court
focused in part on the children, discerning "a basic legislative intent to
enable children to take property from their parents and through their
parents from parental relatives," and noting that "once a child has come
into existence, she is a full-fledged human being and is entitled to all of
the love, respect, dignity, and legal protection which that status re-
quires."' 46 Similarly, in another Social Security benefits driven dispute re-
garding the heir status of posthumously conceived children, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that under certain circumstances, a
posthumously conceived child may enjoy the rights of "issue" under state
intestacy law.47 In crafting its opinion, the court noted the best interests
of the child as one of three "powerful State interests" that had to be bal-
anced and harmonized in order to effectively answer the question of
whether posthumously conceived children enjoy inheritance rights
through intestacy: "First and foremost we consider the overriding legisla-
tive concern to promote the best interests of children. . . .Among the
many rights and protections vouchsafed to all children are rights to finan-
cial support from their parents and their parents' estates. '48
From a family law perspective, defining parentage has implications
concerning legal parentage, custody, adoption, visitation, and support. A
child-centered focus to establishing child status is therefore appropriate
and desirable in this context.
41. Id. at 598, 600-01.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 599-601.
44. 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
45. Id. at 1258-59.
46. Id. at 1262-63.
47. See Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259-60 (Mass. 2002).
48. Id. at 264-65.
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III. CURRENT STATE OF RELEVANT PROPERTY
SUCCESSION LAW
No conclusion should be made about how succession laws define a par-
ent-child relationship without a review of the affected laws and an overall
understanding of the purposes behind those laws. Although succession
law statutes differ from state to state, there are a number of universal
issues. 49
Generally, succession statutes use rigid 50 and mechanical 5' rules based
on formal legal relationships 52 to identify a decedent's family, rather than
trying to determine whether a particular person functioned as part of the
decedent's family. To qualify as a family under most succession laws,
with few exceptions, 53 a surviving individual must have been married to
the decedent or related to the decedent genetically or by adoption. 54 In-
heritance statutes that include definitions of "child," "issue," and similar
terms typically provide merely that a child is a person (natural or
adopted) who is entitled to take from the parent by intestate succession.
A. INTESTACY
When the wishes of a decedent are not known due to a lack of express
intent 55 (for instance, lack of a will, invalidity of a will or a valid will that
49. Because there is no federal law of succession in the United States, state estates
laws govern property succession.
50. Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior Based Model of Inheritance? The Chinese
Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 77 (1998-99) (citing Friedman, supra note 9, at 13
(describing American inheritance rules as a "rigid" scheme)).
51. Id. (citing WAGGONER, supra note 9, at 71 (stating that "[u]nder American law...
intestate shares are determined mechanically")).
52. Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U.
MEM. L. REV. 643, 653-55 (2002).
53. Under limited circumstances, California law provides for a stepchild. CAL. PROB.
CODE § 6454 (West 2009).
54. Although the 2008 UPC Amendments expand the definition of parent-child rela-
tionship for inheritance purposes, no state has had the opportunity to adopt the 2008 UPC
Amendments. Therefore, this Section will examine intestacy based on recurring themes
found under current state intestacy law. For an analysis of the 2008 UPC Amendments, see
infra Part VI.
55. Available empirical research indicates that many people die intestate. See JESSE
DUKEMINIER ET AL., Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 71 (6th ed. 2000) (stating that most people
die without leaving a will); WAGGONER, supra note 9, at 29-30 ("One study found that, in
terms of wealth, 72.3% of persons with estates valued between $0 and $99,000 do not have
wills, 49.8% with estates between $100,000 and $199,000 do not have wills, but only 15.4
with estates between $200,000 and $1 million do not have wills."); Gerry W. Beyer, Statu-
tory Fill-in Will Forms-The First Decade: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Findings,
72 OR. L. REV. 769, 799 n.154 (1993) (indicating that only 37% of his sample of fifty-one
persons had wills); Allison Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Trans-
missions at Death, 30 U. CHi. L. REV. 241, 250 (1962) (reporting that decedents with es-
tates valued below $5,000 had wills only 25% of the time, while decedents with estates
valued in excess of $100,000 had wills 96% of the time); Mary Louise Fellows, Rita J.
Simon, & William Rau, Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate
Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 337 (asserting that
over 45% of the total sampled had wills).
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only disposes a portion of the decedent's probate property56), intestacy
statutes attempt to further an individual's testamentary freedom 57 by dis-
posing of property58 in accordance with the probable intent of the aver-
age intestate decedent.59 In addition to mandating who takes what when
a decedent dies without a will, intestacy statutes serve other purposes as
well. For example, the statute determines who will have standing to con-
test a decedent's will because intestate heirs are interested parties if the
will is invalid.60 In addition, courts have used the statutes as a way to
identify the "natural objects of the legislator's bounty" in determining
will contests alleging undue influence.61 Also, the statutes will be used to
determine "heirs" for class gift purposes. 62
The goal of carrying out the presumed intent of the average intestate
decedent is derived from the concept of testamentary freedom.63 In es-
sence, the intestacy statutes create a default will.64 Intestacy statutes ap-
proximate the distributive scheme that the decedent likely would have
chosen had he or she acted to provide for the distribution of his or her
56. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101(a) (2000) (stating that "[a]ny part of a decedent's
estate not effectively disposed of by will passes by intestate succession to the decedent's
heirs as prescribed in this Code, except as modified by the decedent's will").
57. Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical
Study, 16 LAW & INEQUALITY 1, 11-12 ("By reflecting probable donative intent of those
likely to die without a will, the intestacy statute furthers testamentary freedom because it
gives persons the right not to have to execute wills to assure that accumulated wealth
passes to their intended takers."); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, The Law
of the Dead: Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 340, 355 ("[Intestacy
laws can even be analyzed as an extension of the principle of free disposition of property at
death.").
58. Intestacy statutes only dispose of property held in the decedent's name alone. See
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 11, at 59. The probate process administers a dece-
dent's property either pursuant to a will or by intestacy. See id. Property held in a way
that avoids probate passes by operation of law or the governing instrument. See id.
59. There is widespread acceptance among estates law scholars that an important goal
of any intestacy scheme is and should be to further the donative intent of the intestate
property owner. See Gary, supra note 3, at 7-8 ("The most commonly identified goal of
intestacy statutes is to create a dispositive scheme that will carry out the probable intent of
most testators .... To the extent possible, the statute should distribute the property to the
persons the decedent would have chosen to receive the property if the decedent were mak-
ing the decision."); Fellows et al., supra note 57 (commenting that intestacy statutes reflect
society's commitment to donative freedom).
60. Gary, supra note 52, at 644 n.2 (noting that even though a decedent can avoid the
application of intestacy laws by executing a will, intestate heirs can nevertheless challenge
the will because they would take the property if the will is invalid).
61. Id. at 644; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1056 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "natu-
ral object of testator's bounty" as whoever would take under the laws of intestacy); RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP., supra note 9, § 8.1 cmt. c (defining natural objects of a
testator's bounty as "the testator's closest family members").
62. Determination of "heir" status also has consequences beyond the probate system.
For instance, the Social Security Act determines eligibility of benefits to dependent chil-
dren of a deceased parent on the basis that the surviving child would be treated as an heir
under the state's intestacy law. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(3), 416(h)(2)(A) (2000).
63. See Fellows et al., supra note 57, at 11-12.
64. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP., supra note 9, at ch. 1 (stating that intestate
succession is "a default regime").
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estate at death.65 By so doing, intestacy statutes assume that most dece-
dents would want their property to pass to their family. 66
In addition to furthering donative intent (the prominent goal of intes-
tacy statutes), some scholars have identified subsidiary goals, such as the
ideas that intestacy statutes should reflect society's view of fairness, be
committed to promoting familial-type ties, be concerned with support,
advance reciprocal obligations, and be administratively efficient. 67 In any
given case, these goals may coincide with the goal of fulfilling donative
intent, but they do not necessarily do so and, hence, there are inherent
tensions.
Typically, intestacy statutes provide a disposition for a surviving
spouse, and any part of the decedent's estate that does not pass to a sur-
viving spouse passes then to the decedent's children, if any, and then to
more remote descendants. 68 Therefore, the decedent's children have pri-
ority over most other surviving relatives. 69 Because intestacy statutes
give preference to children, it is imperative that they clearly articulate the
requirements for establishing the parent-child relationship.
For intestacy purposes, a parent-child relationship is understood as a
natural relationship based upon biological reproduction.70 Child status
for inheritance purposes follows easily from the recognition of this natu-
ral fact, or, in the case of adoption, from the statutory creation of a legal
substitute designed to replicate the biological original.7 1 Therefore, in or-
der for an individual to take a child's intestate share, the individual must
have been in a legally recognized parent-child relationship with the dece-
dent, usually the genetic parent or the adoptive parent, regardless of the
actual relationship of the decedent and child or whether the decedent
even knew of the child's existence. 72
65. See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 9, at 912 (noting that intestacy statutes seek to
implement the "objective intent" of the average person); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The
Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76
IOWA L. REV. 223, 230 (1991) (concluding that the decedent's intent is the "predominant
consideration" behind an intestacy statute); T. P. Gallanis, Default Rules, Mandatory Rules,
and the Movement for Same-Sex Equality, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 1513, 1522 (1999) (stating that
the official comments to the UPC state that intestacy rules in the probate code are "explic-
itly designed to mirror the likely intent of the patient, ward, or decedent").
66. See Gary, supra note 3, at 11.
67. See RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 90.02[3] ("[C]ertain so-
cietal goals can be accomplished through an intestacy scheme. These goals may include
support for family members ...."); see also, WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 9, at 33-34
(describing what objectives guide policymakers in developing a system of intestate succes-
sion); Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Con-
text, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1033-37 (2004).
68. For a detailed discussion of common intestacy patterns in the United States, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP., supra note 9. ch. 2: see also WAGGONER ET AL., supra
note 9, at 40-66; see also DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 11, at 59-83
69. Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills, 22
U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 917, 920 (1989).
70. David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal,
Biological and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 125 (2006).
71. Id. at 125-26.
72. But see infra Part VI (discussing the 2008 UPC Amendments).
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Although it might seem like a straightforward mandate, ascertaining a
parent-child relationship in a non-traditional family becomes complex.73
Whether the parent-child relationship exists between mother and a child
or father and a child has an impact in recognizing child status.74 For in-
stance, it was once thought that a mother-child relationship was self-ap-
parent, in that the mother gave birth to a child.75 Therefore, legal
parentage followed child birth, and all children had a right to inherit from
their mothers.76 However, with the advent of egg donations and surro-
gacy, identifying a mother-child relationship based on genetics is no
longer easy. For fathers, whose genetic connections are not as apparent,
legal paternity is often inferred through a network of presumptions and
defenses.77 In addition, because of DNA testing and advancements in
ART (such as sperm donations), recognizing a father-child relationship,
or a presumption thereof, may prove to be difficult as well.
As can be seen, the intestacy statutes use formal definitions to define
the parent-child relationship by adopting rules based on legal relation-
ships. By so doing, the intestacy statutes (i) exclude some individuals
whom the decedent might have considered a child and may have pre-
ferred as a recipient of the decedent's property and (ii) include some indi-
viduals with whom the decedent might have had no relationship. or even
knew of his or her existence. 78 Thus, typical intestacy statutes do not
fulfill the primary goal of carrying out the decedent's intent.
B. CLAss Girts
Class gifts may arise in two scenarios. First, when the instrument is
executed by a testator that refers to his or her own children, a definitional
issue arises. (For example, the testator's will bequeaths his or her estate
to "my children.") Second, when the instrument is executed by someone
other than a parent figure, another definitional issue arises. (For exam-
ple, suppose a testator bequeaths his or her estate to A for life, remainder
to A's children.) In construing the term "children," do we look at the
testator's intention of what constitutes A's children, or A's view of what
73. For example, assume a gay male couple decides to have a child. One person ob-
tains an egg from his sister, which they fertilize with the non-brother's sperm. The gay
couple uses a surrogate (not the sister) to carry the child to term. When the child is born,
with whom does he or she have a parent-child relationship-the sperm donor who in-
tended the child to be his, the non-sperm donor brother who intended the child to be his,
the genetic material donor sister who did not intend the child to be hers, or the birth
mother who did not intend the child to be hers?
74. Martha M. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS L.
REV. 73, 84-85 (2003).
75. See Garrison, supra note 8, at 912.
76. Davis, supra note 74, at 86-87; see also, Garrison, supra note 8, at 912 (noting that
"[blecause pregnancy and birth are relatively public and undisputed, the law has rarely
confronted the question of legal motherhood at all").
77. Meyer, supra note 70, at 127.
78. Gary, supra note 52, at 654.
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constitutes A's children? 79 What rules of construction should determine
whether class designations like "child," "issue," "heir," "grandchild," and
"descendant" used in private dispositive instruments include individuals
that claim membership in the class but are not genetically linked?80
Whether an individual takes under a class gift provision depends on the
testator's intent in using the terminology. When the testator's intent is
clear from the instrument, the intent should be honored. In most cases,
however, the dispositive instrument will not be helpful, and what should
constitute child status probably was never considered by the testator in
the first place. 81 In construing the language then, courts generally try to
deduce what the average donor using the language would have intended.
Courts rely on intestacy statutes to determine distributions under wills
and trusts for class gift purposes. 82 Therefore, like intestacy, parentage is
defined as being created either biologically or through adoption.
Generally, if the transferor of the class gift is a natural or adopting
parent, statutes tend to provide that adopted and non-marital children
are included in class gifts if they qualify to take under the rules of intes-
tate succession. If the transferor of the class gift is someone other than
the natural or adoptive parent, a so-called agency approach is typically
used to define the class gift.83 If the child, usually a non-marital child,
lived while a minor as a regular member of the household of an individ-
ual, then the child shares in a class gift to that individual's children.
C. EQUITABLE ADOPTION
A child who has been adopted pursuant to a state's required adoption
statute is treated as a child of the adoptive parent or parents, and enjoys
the status of a genetic child, including the ability to inherit from or
through the adoptive parent or parents.84 Although not adopted with
statutory formalities, an equitably adopted child nevertheless may be able
to maintain a claim in equity as an intestate heir even though he or she
was not a genetic or legally adopted child.
79. In adoption scenarios, traditionally and until quite recently, the prevailing pre-
sumption was that when a person not a party to the adoption made a class gift to someone
else's children, the donor only intended genetic children born into the class. See Jan Ellen
Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption and Association: Who Should Get What and Why, 37
VAND. L. REv. 711, 733 (1984). This is known as the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine.
Today, this rule has come to be regarded with disfavor, but it has not been totally aban-
doned. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 11, at 89.
80. For purposes of this discussion, this Section assumes that neither the doctrine of
worthier title nor the Rule in Shelley's Case is applicable.
81. Rein, supra note 79, at 732. Perhaps lawyers should interview clients more care-
fully about these issues and be more precise in defining genetic terms under dispostive
instruments.
82. For example, F.S. §732.608 (construing genetic terms for class gift purposes should
be in accordance with rules for determining relationships for intestate succession).
83. See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 9.
84. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (amended 2008) (stating that an adopted
individual is the child of his or her adopting parents and not of his or her natural parents).
Some statutes make an exception for stepparent adoptions. See id.
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Equitable adoption (also called virtual adoption, adoption by estoppel,
and de facto adoption)85 is an equitable remedy construed by courts to
avoid what is perceived as an injustice arising from a strict application of
the intestacy statutes. 86 An equitably adopted child is a child not legally
adopted by the decedent, although the child was raised by the decedent in
the decedent's home as the decedent's child.87 An individual asserts a
claim of equitable adoption in order to take an intestate share of the de-
cedent's estate. 88 Considering that under the laws of succession informal
adoptees have no standing, courts' application of this doctrine is particu-
larly striking.89
Courts have developed two separate theories to justify the results
achieved by the doctrine of equitable adoption: the contract theory and
the estoppel theory. 90 "Courts using the contract theory presuppose that
[the decedent] as promisor has contracted to effect a legal adoption [with
the parents] and that by granting relief, the court is specifically enforcing
the contract." 91 This justification for the implementation of the doctrine,
however, is deficient. Courts have difficulty identifying a "mutuality of
remedy, and other aspects of the so-called contract seem dredged up for
the occasion."'92 Scholars have queried whether anyone, without court
approval, has the authority to make a legal contract designating the
child's adopter.93 Also, there is a problem in determining whether the
child is a third party beneficiary or an actual party to the agreement (and
whether the child is too young to enter a contract).94 Finally, the remedy
of specific enforcement is a fiction in that at least one party to the con-
85. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 20.9 925 (2d ed. 1988); George A. Locke, Annotation, Modern Status of Law as
to Equitable Adoption or Adoption by Estoppel, 97 A.L.R.3d 347, 352 (1980); Rein, supra
note 79, at 767; James R. Robinson, Note, Untangling the "Loose Threads": Equitable
Adoption, Equitable Legitimation, and Inheritance in Extralegal Family Arrangements, 48
EMORY L.J. 943, 955 (1999).
86. Robinson, supra note 85, at 955; Rein, supra note 79, at 767.
87. Robinson, supra note 85, at 955.
88. See id.; CLARK, supra note 85, at 925; Rein, supra note 79, at 767.
89. Rein, supra note 79, at 767.
90. See Rein, supra note 79, at 770; J.L.J., Jr., Note, Equitable Adoption: They Took
Him Into Their Home and Called Him Fred, 58 VA. L. REV. 727, 730-36 (1972); Robinson,
supra note 85, at 956.
91. Rein, supra note 79, at 770. See In re Williams' Estates, 348 P.2d 683, 684 (1960)
("It is generally recognized that where a child's parents agree with the adoptive parents to
relinquish all their rights to the child in consideration of the adoptive parents' agreement
to adopt such child, and to care and provide for it the same as though it were their own
child, and such agreement is fully performed by all parties connected with such contract
except there is no actual adoption, the courts will decree specific performance of such
contract and thereby award to the child the same distributive share of the adoptive parents'
estate as it would have been entitled to had the child actually been adopted as agreed.").
For other cases stressing contractual aspects of the situation, see Habecker v. Young, 474
F.2d 1229, 1229-30 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying Florida law); In re Estate of Lamfrom, 368
P.2d 318, 320-321 (Ariz. 1962); Laney v. Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
92. Rein, supra note 79, at 772.
93. Id.
94. Robinson, supra note 85, at 956.
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tract is dead and is no longer in a position to effectuate the contract. 95
The estoppel theory surmises that equitable estoppel should apply be-
cause the child has performed his or her part of the bargain, and thus the
adoptive parent's estate should be equitably estopped from denying the
child's status as an heir.96 Courts using the estoppel theory emphasize
the child's performance of filial services and protect the child "against the
fraud of the adoptive parents' neglect or design in failing to do that which
he in equity was obligated to do."'97 "Equitable estoppel is a rule of fun-
damental fairness whereby a party is precluded from benefiting from his
inconsistent conduct which has induced reliance to the detriment of
another." 98
A problem arises under this theory concerning the required element of
the child's detrimental reliance-should the reliance be on the contract to
adopt per se, or upon the representation of status? Reliance on the
agreement is usually impossible because a young child cannot compre-
hend the import of a contract. 99 Reliance on the representation of status
is almost as difficult to establish.100 Courts that adhere to the reliance
requirement find themselves rejecting meritous equitable adoption claims
for want of reliance.' 01 Therefore, courts that follow the theory find
themselves in the position of honoring only the claims of plaintiffs who
have conditioned filial devotion upon an implicit promise of heirship. 0 2
At times, it is difficult to ascertain under which theory the court is pro-
ceeding because courts commonly overlap the theories or merge the two
theories together. 103 For instance, both theories are predicated on the
existence of an agreement to adopt.104 Regardless of the theory used,
unless the courts find substantial compliance with the adoption statutes,
the courts almost unanimously require that a contract to adopt be proved
in order for a court to grant equitable relief.'05 Therefore, both of the
purported theoretical bases for equitable adoption are very limited in ap-
95. See CLARK, supra note 85, at 926 ("It does some violence to the concepts of con-
tract to say that on the death of the [equitably adoptive] parent a contract to adopt may be
specifically enforced, since in fact such a contract could possibly not be specifically en-
forced in all respects, as for example in a suit by the natural parent against the foster
parents.")
96. Robinson, supra note 85, at 956.
97. Rein, supra note 79, at 771 (citing Jones v. Guy, 143 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. 1940)).
98. Id. at 776 (citing In re Marriage of Valle, 53 Cal. App. 3d 837, 840 (1975)).
99. Robinson, supra note 85.
100. Id.
101. Rein, supra note 79, at 776-77.
102. Id. at 777. As a result, most of these courts apply the reliance requirement rather
loosely. See id.
103. Id. at 771. See, e.g., Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53 (Alaska 1977); see also
Ramsay v. Lane, 507 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
104. See Rein, supra note 79, at 772.
105. Id. Professor Rein suggests that courts insist that a contract be proved because
courts want to ensure that the decedent intended to adopt the child as an heir, and that the
child grew up believing that a legal adoption had in fact taken place. ld. at 784.
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plication and may produce inconsistent and inequitable results. 10 6
It should be noted, however, that one court has abandoned the need to
prove a contract to adopt. In Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v.
Singer,10 7 a case involving a testamentary trust which directed payment of
income to the testatrix's niece for life and remainder to the niece's chil-
dren, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals observed that:
[I]n many instances a child will be raised by persons not his parents
from an age of tender years, treated as a natural child, and repre-
sented to others as a natural or adopted child. In many instances, the
child will believe himself to be the natural or formally "adopted"
child of the "adoptive" parents only to be treated as an outcast upon
their death. We cannot ascertain any reasonable distinction between
a child treated in all regards as an adopted child but who has been
led to rely to his detriment upon the existence of formal legal
paperwork imagined but never accomplished, and a formally
adopted child. Our family centered society presumes that bonds of
love and loyalty will prevail in the distribution of family wealth along
family lines, and only by affirmative action, i.e., writing a will, may
this presumption be overcome. 10 8
The court rejected the requirement of a contract to adopt and held that
a finding of equitable adoption would be appropriate if a plaintiff could
prove by "clear, cogent and convincing evidence" that his status is identi-
cal to that of a formally adopted child. 10 9
Of course, even for those to whom equitable adoption applies, there
are many remaining issues. Can the equitably adopted child inherit
through the equitably adopted parents from said parents' blood rela-
tives?" If the equitably adopted child is allowed to inherit from his eq-
uitably adopted parent, may the child also inherit from his or her genetic
parents? Does an equitably adopted child have standing to contest the
unfavorable will of his or her equitably adopted parent?"' Would an
equitably adopted child be included in a class gift made by a stranger to
the informal adoption? 12.
106. Id. at 767.
107. 250 S.E.2d 369 (W. Va. 1978).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Pouncy v. Garner, 626 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (holding that an equitably adopted child cannot inherit through the equitably
adopted parents' bloodline). But cf. Wheeling, 250 S.E.2d at 371 (permitting the equitably
adopted daughter to take a child's remainder interest of a testamentary trust under a will
that a stranger to the equitable adoption executed).
111. See Vincent v. Bronis, 365 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1963, no writ)
(allowing an equitably adopted child to contest).
112. See Wheeling, 250 S.E.2d AT 373-74 (including equitably adopted child in class
gift). But cf. Robinson v. Robinson, 215 S.2d 585 (Ala. 1967) (equitable adoption did not
prevent life tenant's death without issue).
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IV. PARENT MAKING: THE PROCESSES AND PROBLEMS
Two branches of technological advancements highlight the inadequa-
cies of succession law's devotion to the sanguinary nexus test. First, ad-
vances in ART throughout the past half-century have changed the
reproductive landscape by allowing the "creation of children in ways pre-
viously unthinkable. '" 113 As a result, these technologies-most impor-
tantly, the timing issues raised by posthumous conception and the social
implications of ART-challenge "traditional" concepts of family through
a dilution of the import of a genetic link in defining familial relation-
ships. 114 Because ART may achieve conception without sex, an individ-
ual or individuals who want a child may use sperm, ova, or gestational
services that have been donated or sold. The legal parentage of children
born through ART is often unclear,115 and legislatures have been slow to
respond to the changing concepts of family and parent-child relation-
ships. 116 For instance, it is now possible for a child to have three potential
"mothers"-one who is the egg donor, one who was the gestational surro-
gate, and one who planned the pregnancy." 7 It is also possible for a child
to have three potential fathers-one who is the sperm donor, one who is
married to the gestational surrogate, and one who planned the
pregnancy. 118
The second technology that has raised estate law issues is genetic map-
ping and testing. It is now easy and cost-effective to identify those indi-
viduals who have in fact provided the genetic materials for the creation of
a child with a very high degree of precision. At least four percent of men
are raising a child as their biological progeny who was actually sired by
another man." 9 Thus, strict adherence to the sanguinary nexus test could
have adverse effects on family harmony. Because of the sanguinary
nexus test's reliance on blood connections, it is possible to exclude from
child status, with DNA testing, a child who the property owner believed
was his or her genetic child but with whom the property owner lacked a
113. Julie Shapiro, Changing Ways, New Technologies and the Devaluation of the Ge-
netic Connection to Children, in FAMILY LAW AND FAMILY VALUES 81, 83 (Marvis
Maclean ed., 2005).
114. Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Thinking About the Law of Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nology, 27 Wis. J. FAM. L. 123 (2007); Shapiro, supra note 113, at 82.
115. For a detailed review of the murkiness of inheritance laws concerning children
born from ART, see Brashier, supra note 6, at 115-16.
116. Problems leading to the lag in legislative responses are the rapid advancements in
new methods of creating children and the ever evolving shifts in parenting norms. See
Garrison, supra note 8, at 839.
117. Naomi Cahn, Children's Interests and Information Disclosure: Who Provided the
Egg and Sperm? Or Mommy, Where (and Whom) Do I Come From?, 2 GEO. J. GENDER
& L. 1, 1 (2000).
118. Id.
119. Mark A. Bellis et al., Measuring Paternal Discrepancy and Its Public Health Conse-
quences, 59 J. EPIDEMISLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 749, 749 (2005), available at jech.
bmjjournals.com. But see S. Macintyre & A. Sooman, Non-paternity and Prenatal Genetic
Screening, 338 LANCET 869 (1991) (reporting that the figure is closer to ten percent).
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genetic link. 120 In addition, DNA testing allows posthumous testing for
paternity long after a decedent's death, 121 thereby inviting claims against
the estate from alleged children whom the decedent may not have even
known existed. Therefore, genetic testing and mapping play an instru-
mental role in defining the parent-child relationship for inheritance
purposes.
The parenting possibilities of ART and genetic testing present a host of
legal issues. Fully comprehending the inadequacies of the sanguinary
nexus test requires a rudimentary knowledge of these technological ad-
vances in child-creating and genetic mapping.
A. METHODS OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
ART refers to methods of achieving pregnancy other than coitus 122
and is widely used to help couples and single persons procreate where
procreation by sexual intercourse has failed or is not desired.123 Individu-
als use ART for a variety of reasons. Some use ART to overcome
problems of infertility, others use ART because they are in a same-sex
relationship. And others use ART because they are single. 124
In the past half-century, there has been a revolution in reproductive
and genetic technology. 125 Advances in ART provide new and diverse
opportunities to create children.
1. Artificial Insemination
Artificial insemination is one of the oldest 126 and most common 127
forms of ART. In this procedure, sperm is non-coitally introduced into
the woman's uterus, cervical canal, or vagina.' 28 If the sperm used to
inseminate a woman is obtained from her husband through a process
120. Although one might presume that a female would know if a child was her genetic
child, because of baby swapping incidents at hospitals, this possibility remains a reality.
121. Ilene Sherwyn Cooper, Posthumous Paternity Testing: A Proposal to Amend
EPTL 4-1.2(a)(2)(D), 69 ALB. L. REV. 947, 964 (2006).
122. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 701 cmt. (2000) (defining ART as a medical technique
which is used to conceive a child apart from sexual intercourse.); Richard R. Storrow,
Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Par-
entage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 597 (2002).
123. See LORI B. ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE: ADVENTURES IN THE NEW WORLD OF
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 220 (1999) (reporting that the ART industry has an annual
revenue of $2 billion and results in tens of thousands of births yearly).
124. Kindegran, supra note 114.
125. ANDREWS, supra note 123, at 219 ("This is truly the Wild West of medicine.").
126. The first reported artificial insemination of humans was performed by English sur-
geon John Hunter in 1790. Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, From Cradle to Tomb: Estate Plan-
ning Considerations of the New Procreation, 57 LA. L. REV. 27, 30 (1996) (citing Jeffrey M.
Shaman, Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 18 J. FAM. L. 331 (1980)).
127. By 1996, approximately 170,000 women underwent artificial insemination each
year, resulting in 65,000 births annually. Karin Mika & Bonnie Hurst, One Way to Be
Born? Legislative Inaction and the Posthumous Child, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 993, 996 (1996).
128. ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 86 (1995).
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known as artificial insemination husband (AIH), 12 9 and the husband also
functions as the social father of the child created, then artificial insemina-
tion poses little challenge from an estates law perspective because there
are no problems with filiation. AIH is simply an alternative means of
conception resulting in a child with two clearly identifiable parents. If,
however, the sperm is obtained from a donor, a process known as artifi-
cial insemination donor (AID),1 30 and the donor has no intention of serv-
ing as the social father, estates law issues arise because the identity of the
father for inheritance purposes becomes unclear because the genetic fa-
ther is different from the intended father.13 ' Also, there seems to be con-
fusion under various state laws concerning insemination when the
insemination is not conducted by a doctor, when the woman is not mar-
ried, or when the sperm donor is known as opposed to anonymous. 132
2. In Vitro Fertilization
In vitro fertilization, or IVF, involves the fertilization of a human egg
outside of a woman's body and the subsequent transfer of the fertilized
egg to a uterus. 133 The mother-to-be is given hormones to increase egg
production, and then gametes are extracted from the genetic parents. 3 4
Next, the gametes are fertilized in a Petri dish and the resulting zygote is
allowed to develop into a pre-embryo. 135 After pre-embryos are
screened for genetic abnormalities or diseases, the screened pre-embryos
are implanted in the mother-to-be's uterus and any surplus pre-embryos
are cryopreserved for future use. Demand for IVF has risen in recent
years in large part because of increasing success rates and decreasing
costs. 136 If one woman intends to raise the child, supply the egg, and give
birth, the technology poses little challenge from an estates law perspec-
tive. Yet, because an egg can be retrieved from one woman and trans-
ferred to the uterus of another woman, the egg donor and the woman
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. For instance, through artificial insemination, it is possible for a child to have three
potential "fathers"-one related to the child genetically, one married to the surrogate who
gave birth to it, and one who planned the pregnancy. Most states have statutes concerning
situations involving sperm donors, specifying that men who provide sperm to sperm banks
are not fathers of any resulting child. There are statutes in thirty-five states that address
artificial insemination. See Polikoff, supra note 8, at 63; ADOPTION LAW & PRACTICES
§ 14.20[2] (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2001).
132. See Polikoff supra note 8, at 64-65; ADOPTION LAWS & PRACTICES, supra note 131,
§ 14.05.
133. BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 128, at 87.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. It has been reported that, by 2003, IVF accounted for more than 1% of total live
births in the United States or nearly 50,000 children each year. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ASSISTED REPRODUC-
TION TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC
REPORTS 13 (2005).
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giving birth may not be the same person.137 Further, the woman in-
tending to raise the child may not be either the egg donor or the woman
giving birth. These scenarios raise issues in defining a parent-child rela-
tionship for inheritance purposes in a system that relies upon the sangui-
nary nexus test as a determinative factor.
3. Cryopreservation
Cryopreservation uses liquid nitrogen to freeze and preserve for future
use cells and tissues, including sperm, ova, ovaries, or embryos. 138 Cry-
opreservation and long-term storage of sperm, eggs, and embryos create
the potential for a child to be not only born, but also conceived, years, or
even decades, after the death of the genetic parents. One question raised
by this process is to what extent a posthumously conceived child should
have inheritance rights, given that conception was after the death of the
genetic parent.
4. Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer
Gamete intrafallopian transfer is similar to an IVF in which unfer-
tilized gametes are transferred to the healthy fallopian tubes of a woman
and fertilization occurs in the fallopian tube instead of in a Petri dish.139
This procedure permits the same possible combinations of egg donors,
gestational mothers, and third-party sperm donors as with IVF, and, ac-
cordingly, the same estate law issues arise.
5. Surrogacy
Under surrogacy technology, the child's birth parent is not a legal par-
ent. 140 Most surrogacy laws assume that the "surrogate" birth mother is
genetically related to the child; they thus fail to address the increasingly
common phenomenon of gestational surrogacy. 141 With gestational sur-
rogacy, it is possible for a child to have three "mothers"-one who is
genetically related to the child, one who gave birth to the child, and one
who planned the pregnancy and intended the child to be hers.142 Current
laws, even in states with statutes governing surrogacy, typically fail to of-
137. There has been relatively little regulation of egg providers. Only a small number
of cases have regulated parenthood through the use of eggs. Garrison, supra note 8, at 897.
138. As early as 1866, an Italian scientist, Montegazza, who discovered that sperm
could be frozen, suggested that women whose husbands might be killed at war might want
to avail themselves of that discovery. E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The
Widow and the Sperm: The Law of Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 234
(1986-87).
139. BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 128, at 87.
140. ALI-ABA Audio Seminar: Reproductive Technology's Impact on Estate Planning:
Children of the New Biology, Gideon Rothschild, The Issue of Issue or The Child I Never
Had, Aug. 19, 2008, http://files.ali-aba.org/thumbs/datastorage/skobesruoc/pdf!TSPB03
Chapter 03thumb.pdf [hereinafter Rothschild, Issue of Issue].
141. Gestational surrogacy is where an egg is provided by a donor and fertilized and
implanted into a surrogate who is not the egg donor.
142. Garrison, supra note 8, at 839.
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fer clear, or even murky, answers as to the rights and obligations of these
various parties.
6. Cloning
As advances in technology verify the potential for human cloning, the
possibility of offspring with a single genetic progenitor remains plausi-
ble.143 Cloning would produce "children who have but one source of ge-
netic material[s] ...[but] ...whose genetic material[s] can be traced
directly to [the clone's] grandparents. ' 144 The implications to the law of
inheritance are obvious. Is the cloned child treated as the child of the
genetic material donor or as a child of the individuals with whom the
child shares the genetic link?
Within these various options discussed above there is still more flexibil-
ity. For example, cryopreservation can involve preservation of oocytes,
ovarian tissue, embryos, or sperm (which itself can either be privately or
anonymously donated). 145 Artificial insemination can be by a husband, a
donor, or even a combination of husband and donor.146 Surrogacy can be
traditional, where the birth mother is not the legal mother but is the ge-
netic mother, or gestational, where the birth mother is neither the legal
mother nor the genetic mother. 47 The net result is a confusing array of
''parents."
These various ART options can help people overcome obstacles to re-
production arising from personal choice, biological limitations of same-
sex couples, infertility, death of a partner, risk of disease transfer to a
partner, risk of genetic disease to a child, or risk of future infertility or
premature death of a partner.' 48 Professor Charles Kindregan offers the
following non-exhaustive list of some of the ways ART allows for non-
coital reproduction:
[S]ame-gender female partners who can employ intrauterine insemi-
nation to produce a pregnancy in one of the partners with the sperm
of an anonymous donor or a known donor; same-gender male part-
ners who can employ a traditional surrogate to carry a child for them
using the sperm of one of them to produce the pregnancy by in-
trauterine insemination; same-gender female partners who agree
that one of them will become pregnant by in vitro fertilization or a
similar procedure, such as gamete intrafallopian transfer, gamete
uterine transfer or peritoneal ovum and sperm transfer; same-gender
female partners who agree that they will employ a gestational surro-
gate to carry a child for them using the egg of either one of them and
donated sperm; same-gender female partners using donated sperm
and donated eggs which are fertilized in vitro, producing embryos
143. See Shapiro, supra note 113, at 86; see also Rick Weiss, Mature Human Embryos
Created From Adult Skin Cells, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2008, at Al.
144. Shapiro, supra note 113, at 86.
145. Rothschild, Issue of Issue, supra note 140.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Kindregan, supra note 114, at 6.
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intended to be implanted in one of them; same-gender male partners
who provide the sperm of one of them to fertilize a donated egg in
vitro, with the resulting embryo to be carried by a female gestational
carrier; male and female couple who employ the sperm of a donor to
make the female pregnant by intrauterine insemination because of
the infertility of the male partner, or to avoid a disease carried by the
male partner or because of Rh blood incompatibility; male and fe-
male couple who use an embryo produced by another couple which
is fertilized in vitro and cryopreserved in order to be implanted into
[th]e uterus of the female; same-gender female partners who use an
embryo produced by another couple which is fertilized in vitro and
cryopreserved in order to be implanted into the uterus of one of the
female partners; male and female couple who use their own gametes
but employ intrauterine insemination to produce a pregnancy be-
cause male impotence makes sexual intercourse impossible; un-
partnered female who uses donated sperm to become pregnant by
intrauterine insemination; unpartnered female who uses donated
sperm and in vitro fertilization to become pregnant because of defec-
tive or diseased fallopian tubes; unpartnered male who uses either
his own sperm or donated sperm and by use of intrauterine insemi-
nation employs the services of a surrogate carrier to give birth to a
child he intends to raise.149
These examples, "combined with the ability of reproductive medical
science to cryopreserve gametes or embryos, the availability of post-birth
adoption to cement a legal parent-child relationship and use of co-parent-
ing agreements,' 50 are the tip of an iceberg of a myriad of ways where
legal issues concerning parentage arise in the context of the non-tradi-
tional family.
For probate purposes, one obvious implication of these new technolo-
gies is that the traditional postmortem gestational window of nine months
may be insufficient because children can now be conceived years after the
death of one or both genetic parents. Indeed, not only does technology
allow for posthumous conception, it even allows for posthumous extrac-
tion of gametes to be used in posthumous conception. In July 1998, Gaby
Vernoff, a California woman, was impregnated with sperm that had been
frozen for fifteen months; the sperm, collected by a team of doctors who
went to the coroner's office to perform the procedure, had been extracted
from her husband's epididymus thirty hours after his death. 15' Putting
aside, temporarily, the crucial 152 issue of intent to procreate presented by
posthumous gamete extraction and some other forms of gamete extrac-
149. Id. at 6-7.
150. Id. at 7.
151. A Birth Spurs Debate on Using Sperm After Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1999, at
All.
152. While the issues of consent and intent are pertinent to the ethical debate of the
propriety of certain forms of ART, this Article does not address that debate. Rather, as
explained above, the issues of consent and intent are critical here for their approximation
of testamentary intent.
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tion,153 posthumous conception as a whole is a relevant and viable consid-
eration for probate law. The tension is apparent. In striking the
appropriate balance, the law must also consider the practical need for
finality in probate.
A second, far broader implication of these new technologies is their
practical social effect. Following in the footsteps of increasing divorce
rates and the increasing acknowledgement of same-sex couples, 154 ART
presents the most recent example of the evolution away from the tradi-
tional concept of family through a dilution of the import of a genetic link
in defining familial relationships. 155 Whether due to gamete donation or
surrogacy, ART allows for a deviation between children's intended par-
ents and their genetic or even gestational parents. 156
Augmenting the dilution of the genetic link's import in defining familial
relationships that result from the increased use of ART is a further dilu-
tion of that link brought about by changes in methods of ART itself. For
example, the once-popular method of Confused Artificial Insemination,
whereby the husband's sperm is mixed with a donor's sperm so as to keep
the actual fertilizing sperm unknown-a method that "allows the [father]
to embrace the possibility that he is the child's natural father"-has been
abandoned and is now "virtually extinct. ' 157 Advances in the continually
developing forms of ART could continue to further dilute the role of the
genetic link in parentage. Technology to create artificial sperm from
bone marrow has experts speculating that within five to ten years it will
be possible to bear children without a male genetic father. 158 Going a
step further, one human genetics professor at Oxford University, noting
an evolutionary decline in the male-creating Y chromosome, predicts that
heterosexual reproduction may have a remaining shelf life of 125,000
153. Gamete extraction need not be posthumous to raise issues as to intent and con-
sent. Daniel Christy, an Iowa man, was critically injured in a motorcycle accident in Sep-
tember of 2007. As he lay dying in a hospital bed, unconscious and with little brain activity
after suffering a series of strokes, his parents and his fianc6 got a court order allowing them
to harvest his sperm before he died. Jennifer Hemmingsen, Judge: Family Can Get Dying
Son's Sperm, GAZETTE ONLINE, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.gazetteonline.com/apps/pbcs.
dll/article?AID=/20070913/NEWS/70913034/1001/NEWS. Doctors removed sperm from
Christy inside the hospital's surgical intensive care unit. Jennifer Hemmingsen, Racing
Against Time, Man's Sperm Harvested Before He Dies, GAZETTE ONLINE, Sept. 15, 2007,
http://www.gazetteonline.com/apps/pbcs.dl/article?AID=/20070915/NEWS/70914054/1001/
NEWS. About fifteen minutes later, hospital staff turned off Christy's respirator, and
within a few minutes he died. Id. Not to overstate the point, conception through ART
should not be viewed with a skepticism that assumes lack of consent. Indeed, conception
through ART often evinces a conscious decision indicative of intent to procreate even
more so than conception through sexual intercourse. See Kindregan, supra note 116
("[P]ersons who employ reproductive technology are making a conscious decision to pro-
create a child, whereas 'natural' reproduction often occurs simply as the result a sexual
intercourse without a specific reproductive intent.").
154. See Shapiro, supra note 113, at 88.
155. See id.; see also Kindregan, supra note 114.
156. See Shapiro, supra note 113, at 83-86.
157. Stacey Sutton, Note, The Real Sexual Revolution: Posthumously Conceived Chil-
dren, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 857, 863 (1999).
158. See Kindregan, supra note 114.
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years; after that, male infertility and the disintegration of the Y chromo-
some could "lead to the extinction of the male gender. 159
B. GENETIC TESTING
Advanced technology now enables scientists to establish, with a high
degree of probability, if not certainty, 160 which individuals provided the
genetic material that created a child. Not only is this technology feasible,
but it has become increasingly common, visible,161 and inexpensive.1 62
DNA testing can be used not only to establish paternity, but to disestab-
lish paternity (or overcome presumptions of paternity) as well. 163
Although commonly used in American courts now, DNA testing was
not always highly regarded by American courts. By the late 1960s, DNA
testing had become accurate enough to be used not only to prove pater-
nity, but to disprove paternity as well.164 Although the American Medi-
cal Association advocated the use of DNA testing to prove paternity as
early as the 1950s, American courts were reluctant to accept it as evi-
dence. 165 DNA evidence was first introduced in the United States court
system in 1986, but it was not until 1998 that all United States jurisdic-
tions allowed DNA evidence.166 Recognizing the significant evidentiary
value of DNA testing, all fifty states and the federal government have
integrated it as an essential tool in investigations.167
There are several different DNA technologies available for testing, the
most reliable of them being Polymerase Chain Reaction and Short Tan-
dem Repeats.1 68 This method requires only a minimal amount of genetic
material and allows damaged and contaminated DNA samples to be ana-
lyzed, thereby allowing for reliable posthumous paternity testing.169 Al-
159. Lois Rogers, Homo Erectus Extinctus, SUNDAY TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, at 38, availa-
ble at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life-and style/men/article3040118.ece.
160. When combined with the so-called "genetic blood marker" tests, such as standard
blood grouping or HLA tests, DNA analysis can determine paternity with over
99.999999% accuracy. E. Donald Shapiro et al., The DNA Paternity Test: Legislating the
Future Paternity Action, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 29 (1993).
161. Several popular television talk shows entertain viewers by featuring live paternity
testing.
162. Various websites offer paternity testing kits. See, e.g., DNASolutions, DNA Pater-
nity Testing, http://www.dnanow.com (offering kits plus results for $189); Worldwide Ge-
netics DNA Testing Center, In-Home Paternity Test, http://www.worldwidepaternity.com
(offering kits plus results for $199).
163. Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn't Want to be Daddy Anymore, 16 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 193, 193-94 (2004).
164. HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 129-31 (1971).
165. Id. at 129.
166. Cynthia Bryant, Note, When One Man's DNA Is Another Man's Exonerating Evi-
dence: Compelling Consensual Sexual Partners of Rape Victims to Provide DNA Samples to
Postconviction Petitioners, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 113, 117-18 (2000).
167. Holly Schaffter, Note, Postconviction DNA Evidence: A 500 Pound Gorilla in
State Courts, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 695, 696 (2002).
168. Cooper, supra note 121, at 964 (citing Diana Borteck, Note, Please for DNA Test-
ing: Why Lawmakers Should Amend State Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statutes to Apply
to Prisoners Who Pled Guilty, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1429, 1450 (2004)).
169. Id.
[Vol. 62
HeinOnline  -- 62 S.M.U. L. Rev. 394 2009
Parent-Child Property Succession
though unpleasant, the increase in the accuracy of posthumous paternity
testing has a corresponding increase in requests for exhumation of the
purported father's remains. 170
Ironically, as advances in DNA testing strengthen the results of the
sanguinary nexus test, the question for succession law has become not
whether DNA testing can establish whether an individual genetically
parented the child, but rather, whether the fact is relevant in determining
a parent-child relationship for inheritance purposes. Because of DNA
testing, we are confronted with the reality of the disjunction between so-
cial and/or legal parenting and genetic ties. 171 To discover that a per-
ceived "natural" parent has in fact no genetic tie to his or her children is
disruptive. Does the individual cease to be a parent in the eye of society?
Will he or she no longer want to provide for the child? Likewise, to what
avail is determining posthumous paternity if the alleged father never had
a relationship with the claimant or might not have even known of his or
her existence? At a minimum, advances in DNA testing force us to
reevaluate exactly how important genetic links really are.
V. CASE ANALYSES
What makes an individual recognizable as a parent to a child is a com-
plex question. The reasons for recognizing child status change depending
on whether the status is recognized for family law or estates law purposes.
A review of some family court parental determination cases exposes the
inherent conflict between these two legal disciplines and illustrates why
the child-centered approach is inadequate for succession law purposes.
A. FERGUSON V. McKIERNAN 1 7 2
In 1991, Joel McKiernan began a sexual relationship with his co-
worker, Ivonne Ferguson.173 Ferguson was married at the time, but she
and her husband had separated years earlier. 174 The relationship between
McKiernan and Ferguson was sporadic, and it continued in an on-again,
off-again fashion for approximately two years. 175 In 1993, after their af-
fections for each other had waned, Ferguson approached McKiernan in
regards to conceiving a child.' 76 McKiernan declined.177 After discover-
ing that she could only conceive through in vitro fertilization, Ferguson
170. Brashier, supra note 6, at 141.
171. Shapiro, supra note 113, at 87 (noting that this is usually a problem with regards to
fatherhood, but it does affect motherhood in the instances of babies being switched at
birth).
172. 855 A.2d 121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
173. Id. at 122. Throughout the affair, Ferguson, for unknown reasons, represented to
McKiernan that she was on birth control, when in fact she had had a tubal ligation. Id.
Ferguson later discovered that the tubal ligation could not be reversed and she could only
conceive a child through in vitro fertilization. Id.
174. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 60 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 361 (Pa. Com. P1. 2002).
175. Ferguson, 855 A.2d at 122.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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again approached McKiernan and asked if he would provide his sperm
for the procedure.' 78 Ferguson assured McKiernan that she had thor-
oughly considered being a single mother and that she was in the financial
position to support a child.' 79 Reluctant at first, McKiernan agreed to
provide his sperm, on the condition that he would be an anonymous
sperm donor and that he would have no responsibility to any of the chil-
dren born from the procedure.180
Throughout the pregnancy McKiernan intended to remain anonymous
and uninvolved.181 He did not attend any of Ferguson's prenatal exami-
nations.18 2 Subsequently, Ferguson went into premature labor with
twins.183 Upset about the chance that she could lose the twins, Ferguson
contacted McKiernan.18 4 Believing that Ferguson had nowhere else to
turn, McKiernan attended the birth, but he continued to maintain his an-
onymity. 18 5 McKiernan was not named on the children's birth certificate
as father.18 6 In fact, in accordance with McKiernan and Ferguson's
agreement, Ferguson named Paul Ferguson, now her ex-husband, as fa-
ther on the children's birth certificates.18 7
McKiernan visited the hospital on a few occasions after the children
were born and on one other occasion two years later when he was in town
to visit his parents.' 88 He never provided financial support or gifts to the
children and never held himself out as a parent of the children.' 89 There
was no other contact between Ferguson and McKiernan until 1999, when
Ferguson filed for child support. 190
As a result of Ferguson's suit, the Pennsylvania court system acknowl-
edged that Ferguson's intentional deception was "despicable," but, never-
theless, found that McKiernan was responsible for child support
payments. 191 McKiernan appealed to the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania, but to no avail. 192 The Superior Court affirmed the rulings of
the lower courts, finding that even though the oral agreement between
Ferguson and McKiernan constituted a valid contract, the contract was
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. On the same day as Ferguson's procedure, her husband filed for divorce. Fer-
guson v. McKiernan, 60 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 354-55 (Pa. Com. P. 2002).
181. Ferguson, 855 A.2d at 122. However, when McKiernan's brother questioned Fer-
guson about the pregnancy, she revealed that McKiernan was the sperm donor. Ferguson,
60 Pa. D. & C.4th at 358. McKiernan himself later confirmed to his brother that he was the
donor. Id. McKiernan also admitted to his parents that he was the donor after they had
received anonymous phone calls. Id.
182. Id. at 357.
183. Id. at 358.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Ferguson, 855 A.2d at 122.
188. Ferguson, 60 Pa. D. & C.4th at 358.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Ferguson, 855 A.2d at 123.
192. Id.
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nonetheless unenforceable.' 93 The court reasoned that the right to sup-
port belongs to a child, not a parent, and, as such, a parent does not have
the status to bargain that right away. 194
The conflict between family law jurisprudence and estates law jurispru-
dence is evident in this case. The court is concerned with establishing
legal parentage, incident to which duties and obligations arise. The pur-
pose of succession law is to determine the distribution of a decedent's
estate. Once parental obligations attach, why should default inheritance
rights attach as well? Here, McKiernan entered into a valid agreement
that he would be treated as if he was an anonymous donor and, accord-
ingly, have no parental responsibility or obligations. In addition, McKier-
nan was not identified as the father at the birth of the children, he never
acknowledged that he was the father of the children, and he had no con-
tact with the children until the child support suit was filed over five years
later.195 There was no functional parent-child relationship. In defining
this parent-child relationship for inheritance purposes, McKiernan's view
of the relationship becomes imperative in order to respect McKiernan's
testamentary freedom. There is no need to coordinate child status for
both child support purposes and inheritance purposes.
B. SHONDEL J. V. MARK D. 1 96
Over the spring of 1995, Shondel J. and Mark D. were involved in a
sexual relationship while living in the country of Guyana. 197 The next
January, Shondel gave birth to a daughter and listed Mark as the fa-
ther.198 At the time of the birth, Mark was living in New York.199 Upon
finding out about the birth, Mark declared in a sworn statement, nota-
rized by the Guyana General-Counsel, that he was convinced that he was
the child's father.200 In the same statement, Mark explicitly acknowl-
edged his paternal responsibilities, including child support.20 1
Subsequent to the birth of the child, Mark's actions were consistent
with those of a father. Mark began providing financial support to the
child.202 Later, in 1996, he visited the child in Guyana.20 3 In 1998, Mark
signed a statement in a Guyana registry indicating that he was the child's
father and changing the child's last name to his. 2°4 He later listed the
child as his daughter and primary beneficiary on his life insurance pol-
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Ferguson, 60 Pa D. & C. 4th at 358.
196 853 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 2006).
197. Id. at 611.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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icy.20 5 He continued to send the child's mother, Shondel, regular child
support payments until June 1999.206 In 1999, Mark married another wo-
man, with whom he had children.
In the summer of 2000, Shondel began to receive the child support pay-
ments less frequently.20 7 As a result, in August of 2000, she filed a court
action against Mark, seeking orders of filiation and support.20 8 At first,
Mark responded by requesting visitation of the child. 20 9 However, Mark
later requested a DNA test.2 10 The test showed that in fact Mark was not
the father of the child.2 11
An appointed Law Guardian found that Mark's actions were consistent
with those of a father, and therefore, equitable estoppel prevented him
from claiming that he was now not the father of the child even though he
was not genetically the father of the child. 2 12 The Court of Appeals of
New York affirmed this ruling.2 13 The court stated that "the case turns
exclusively on the best interests of the child."'2 14 Accordingly, it found
that it was in the best interests of the child that Mark be estopped from
denying his paternity because the child had come to rely on Mark as her
father to her detriment.2 15
Once again, family law goals collide with estates law goals. Whether
Mark and the child qualify as a parent-child relationship for inheritance
purposes should focus on Mark's recognition of a parent-child relation-
ship. Because of deceit, Mark believed this child to be his child. Even
though Mark was deceived, and, in fact, there was no genetic relationship
between Mark and the child, Mark was ordered to pay child support. 216
Absent the development of a functional parent-child relationship be-
tween Mark and this child, granting inheritance rights to this child would
frustrate donative intent and potentially diminish any inheritance Mark
may intend to provide for those with whom Mark has developed a par-
ent-child relationship.
C. PHILLIPS V. IRONS
2 1 7
In January of 1999, Dr. Richard Phillips, M.D. and Dr. Sharon Irons,
M.D. started dating and began a relationship together.2 18 The relation-
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 612.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 612-13.
213. Id. at 614.
214. Id. at 616.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 612, 616.
217. No. 1-03-2992, 2005 WL 4694579 (I11. App. Ct. Feb. 22, 2005).
218. Id. at *1. The fact scenario focuses on the ruling in the parentage action. The
citations are taken from a subsequent case on other issues that includes the facts of the
parentage action.
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ship between Phillips and Irons grew quickly.219 Soon the couple was
engaged to be married.220
While a couple, Phillips and Irons discussed the prospect of having chil-
dren.2 21 Phillips made it known to Irons that he was against having chil-
dren prior to marriage. 222 Accordingly, he explained to Irons that he
intended to use a condom if the two were to have sexual intercourse prior
to marriage.223 Irons understood and agreed.224
Throughout the duration of the relationship, Phillips and Irons engaged
in sexual relations only three times-but never sexual intercourse. 225 The
relations took place sometime between February 19, 1999 and March 19,
1999.226 Vaginal penetration never occurred; rather, the two only per-
formed oral sexual acts. 227 During the relations, Irons indicated that she
did not want to have actual sexual intercourse because she was on her
period.228 However, Irons used Phillips' semen obtained from the oral
sex act to successfully artificially inseminate herself, unbeknownst to
Phillips.229
In May of 1999, Phillips discovered that Irons was in fact still married
to another man, Dr. Adeboale Adeleye. 230 She had earlier lied to Phil-
lips, telling him that she was already divorced.231 However, the divorce
had not taken place.232 To show Phillips that she planned to get the di-
vorce, Irons showed him a "Petition for Dissolution of Marriage," filed
on May 20, 1999, indicating her intent to finalize the divorce. 233 The peti-
tion also included a portion where Irons swore that she was not preg-
nant.234 Nevertheless, Phillips ended the relationship. 235
On December 1, 1999, Irons gave birth to a daughter, Serena. 236 Irons
listed Adeleye-not Phillips-as the father on Serena's birth certifi-
cate.237 However, on November 21, 2000, Irons filed a "Petition to Es-
tablish Paternity and Other Relief" against Phillips. 238 Prior to the filing
of the petition, Phillips had no knowledge of Iron's pregnancy or the birth
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. Two of the three instances took place on the same day. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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of the child.239 DNA testing proved that Phillips was in fact Serena's
biological father.240 Accordingly, the court awarded child support to
Irons in the amount of $800 a month, which was later increased to $1,600
a month.241
This case demonstrates why family law jurisprudence or parental sup-
port obligation determinations should not be considered in estates law.
Phillips had no knowledge of Serena, nor did he have a functional parent-
child relationship with her.242 It was alleged that Phillips did not even
have sexual intercourse with Irons.243 The court was concerned with the
best interest of the child in determining child support. Although a noble
goal, estates law is concerned with the distribution of a decedent's estate
in a way that would foster donative intent. If the status of this relation-
ship does not change, Serena should not be recognized as a child for in-
heritance purposes.
VI. REDEFINING PARENT-CHILD STATUS
Current estates law is clearly inadequate to resolve issues arising from
the evolving notions of American families. Changing family structures,
various forms of ART, and advances in genetic testing have rendered the
sanguinary nexus test archaic and impractical. 244 No longer should ge-
netic relationships be a necessary or a sufficient condition for establishing
parent-child status for inheritance purposes. As society and family law
have redefined parentage from its traditional genetic definition, the law
of succession continues to treat the nuclear family as a bastion while ig-
noring the reality that the nuclear family has "failed. '245
The static nature of estates law, however, has not inhibited debate
among estates law scholars concerning the parent-child status for inheri-
tance purposes. To date, in an attempt to redefine the parent-child rela-
tionship to comport with the diversity of modern relationships extant in
American life, scholars have advocated two approaches: the formal ap-
proach and the functionally based approach.246
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Chris Hack, Man Claiming Stolen Sperm Ordered to Double Child Support, CHI.
SUN TIMES, Mar. 14, 2005, at 24. The reasoning for the court's decision to award child
support is unreported. However, the result of awarding child support in this case is in line
with concept in family law that the child's interests are first and foremost. Therefore, since
biological paternity was determined, the court likely awarded child support because such a
ruling was in the best interests of the child.
242. See Phillips, 2005 WL 4694579, at *1.
243. See id.
244. See Brashier, supra note 6, at 193 (explaining the inheritance rights of nonmarital
children and children conceived through ART are unclear in many states).
245. Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879,
880-82 (1984).
246. For an interesting and persuasive discussion about abandoning the family law par-
adigm altogether for succession law purposes, see generally Foster, supra note 11.
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A. THE FORMAL APPROACH
The formal approach looks to the formal legal status of the individuals.
According to the formal approach, terms such as "parent" refer only to
the genetic parent unless explicit statutory language legally recognizes an
alternative form.247 This approach accepts the sanguinary nexus defini-
tion of children "based on blood," but expands the opportunities for fam-
ilies to establish other legal ties, for example, the extension of inheritance
rights to legally adopted children. 248 Currently, under the formal analy-
sis, only individuals related by blood or adoption qualify as a parent-child
relationship. 249 Given that there are only limited statutory exceptions to
the traditional definition of a parent-child relationship, the formal ap-
proach continues to privilege the traditional family over alternative fam-
ily units. 250 In addition, this ad hoc approach to fixing modern problems
that were entirely uncontemplated by the drafters of the laws addressing
them has been proven inadequate, left courts frustrated, and exposed the
need for a legislative reaction to evolving family structures and ART-
born legal issues.251 To accommodate the ever changing dynamics of the
American family, a formal approach to defining parent-child status would
need to be so riddled with additions and exceptions that it would no
longer be useful.252
B. THE FUNCTIONALLY BASED APPROACH
Instead of focusing on the identities and the formal attributes of the
individuals within the relationship, the functionally based approach fo-
cuses instead on the nature of the relationship between the individuals.
This approach recognizes that the human family is a social relationship,
not an entity defined by nature. 253 In defining a parent-child relation-
ship, the functionally based approach's principal concern is whether the
individuals shared the essential characteristics of a traditionally accepted
parent-child relationship. 254 In other words, did the parent and child act
like a parent and child? Therefore, the specific characteristics of each
247. Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach
to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (1991).
248. Id. at 1641.
249. Id. at 1645.
250. Id.
251. See Kindregan, supra note 116.
252. For an example, see the 1990 UPC Amendments discussed infra in Subsection C of
this Section.
253. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 647
(1980).
254. Id.; Hernandez, supra note 1, at 1006 (Non-nuclear families should be legitimized
"that share the essential qualities of traditional relationships for a given context by inquir-
ing whether a relationship shares the main characteristics of caring, commitment, economic
cooperation and participation in domestic responsibilities"); Mary D. Polikoff, This Child
Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-
Mothers and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 573 (1990) ("[C]ourts should
redefine parenthood to include anyone in a functional relationship that a legally recog-
nized parent created with the intent that an additional parent-child relationship exist.").
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relationship become determinative in the recognition of a parent-child
relationship. 255
Family law scholars have advocated a more functionally based defini-
tion of family that more closely reflects societal trends in family struc-
tures rather than a traditional and formal view of family. 256 Scholars
have developed this approach under various headings, such as functional
parent, de facto parent,257 in loco parentis, 258 equitable estoppel, 259 emo-
tional or psychological parent, 260 equitable parent, 61 and nonexclusive
parent. 262 Regardless of the descriptive term used, the concept seems to
be rooted in the psychological parent described in Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit's Beyond the Best Interests of the Child.263 "The psychological par-
ent may be a biological[,] ... adoptive, foster, or common-law ... parent,
or any other person. There is no presumption in favor of any of these
after the initial assignment at birth .... 264
Recognizing the realities of the diversity of family structures extant in
American life, family courts have begun to implement family law schol-
ars' redefinition of parent-child status as being functionally based, rather
than genetic. For instance, in Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.,265 a housing
regulation dispute, the New York Court of Appeals adopted a function-
ally based approach to define family as opposed to a formal approach.2 66
The court stated:
[W]e conclude that the term family ...should not be rigidly re-
stricted to those people who have formalized their relationship by
obtaining, for instance, a marriage certificate or an adoption order.
255. Many scholars have written in favor of the functional approach. See, e.g., JOSEPH
G. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 7 (2d ed. 1979);
Barlett, supra note 7; Polikoff, supra note 254, at 573; Gary, supra note 3, at 41-42.
256. Hernandez, supra note 1, at 1004; see also JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAM-
ILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE 4, 29 (1997); MARY
ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 4-6 (1989) (noting the change in
the family structure to include families in many different forms); Bartlett, supra note 7, at
294 (proposing a concept of "nonexclusive parenthood" for a child that has developed
significant relationships with persons outside the nuclear family); Polikoff, supra note 244,
at 471-74 (advocating a new definition of parenthood to adapt to the complexities of mod-
ern families); Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 250, at 1646.
257. See Stitham v. Henderson, 768 A.2d 598, 603 (Me. 2001); Kristine L. Burks, Rede-
fining Parenthood: Child Custody and Visitation When Nontraditional Families Dissolve, 24
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 223, 245 (1994).
258. See Burks, supra note 257, at 257.
259. Simmons v. Comer, 438 S.E.2d 530, 536 (W. Va. 1993); AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(b)
(2000).
260. See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 546 n.3 (N.J. 2000) ("The terms psychological
parent, de facto parent, and functional parent are used interchangeably.... Psychological
parent is the preferred term.").
261. See Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Burks,
supra note 259, at 252.
262. See Burks, supra note 257, at 254.
263. Storrow, supra note 122, at 666 (citing GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 255).
264. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 255, at 98.
265. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
266. Id. at 53-54.
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The intended protection against sudden eviction should not rest on
fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find
its foundation in the reality of family life. In the context of eviction,
a more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes
two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and char-
acterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdepen-
dence. This view comports both with our society's traditional
concept of "family" and with the expectations of individuals who live
in such nuclear units. 26
7
Likewise, in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,268 a landmark
case recognizing same-sex marriage, the Massachusetts appellate court
endorsed the functionally based approach to parentage in stating that:
[T]he Commonwealth affirmatively facilitates bringing children into
a family regardless of whether the intended parent is married or un-
married, whether the child is adopted or born into a family, whether
assistive technology was used to conceive the child, and whether the
parent or her partner is heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual.269
Although family law and family courts have begun to define family in a
functionally based manner,270 the implementation of the approach has
been, and should be, child-centered for family law purposes. Because of
family law's overarching concern for a child's well being, the functionally
based approach has been used to implement and further the best interest
of the child ideology. Accordingly, this child-centered focus influences
and molds court decisions concerning legal parentage, custody, visitation,
and support issues.
As family law scholars began to flesh out a functionally based approach
for parentage purposes, estates law scholars took notice and began to de-
bate functionalism's merits for succession law purposes.27 1 To date, how-
ever, estates law scholars have not debated the redefinition of parent-
child status from a pure functionally based approach but rather from a
hybrid functionally based approach.272 The hybrid functionally based ap-
proach accepts the sanguinary nexus definition of children "based on
blood or formal legal registration process" but expands the definition by
267. Id.
268. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
269. Id. at 962.
270. A functionally based approach has had a very limited application in succession
laws. Intestacy laws have begun to use a functionally based approach in very limited cir-
cumstances-or, more accurately, a negative functionally based approach. See Paula A.
Monopoli, "Deadbeat Dads": Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 257, 260 n.11 (1994) (reviewing statutes and case decisions barring parents and
spouses from inheritance in cases of abandonment, desertion or failure to support); Alison
M. Stemler, Note, Parents Who Abandon or Fail to Support Their Children and Apportion-
ment of Wrongful Death Damages, 27 J. FAM. L. 871 (1989) (discussing legislative andjudicial responses to prevent distribution of wrongful death awards to parents who aban-
don or failed to support their children).
271. See generally Gary, supra note 3, at 42-56.
272. See id. at 72.
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including a functional aspect to the parent-child definition. 273 For in-
stance, Professor Gary proposed a revision to inheritance laws that added
"a functional definition to the existing formal definitions of parent and
child."' 274 The proposal does not disturb existing rules governing parent-
child status, such as paternity or adoption, but adds a new layer onto the
already established formal definition.275
This Article suggests that the sanguinary nexus test for defining child
status should be replaced by an unadulterated functionally based ap-
proach that inquires into the existence, or lack thereof, of a parent-child
relationship as the sole means for determining child status for purposes of
succession laws.276 Parenthood is increasingly seen as a functional status,
rather than one derived from biology or legal entitlement. 277 Therefore,
this approach advocates a complete break in the link between genetic and
social parenthood. 278 The mere contribution of genetic material is not a
sufficient condition to establish parent-child status.279 The unadulterated
functionally based approach will include as child status those individuals
the decedent treated as his or her children. If there was not a parent-
child relationship, an individual would not take a child's intestate share,
regardless of a genetic link. Accordingly, some children may have no
parents for inheritance purposes. Conversely, some children may have
multiple parents (two, three, four, or more) for inheritance purposes.
Such an approach would ensure consistency in our treatment of property
owners and would focus attention on property rights and the intent of the
property owner rather than family law policy and technological novelty.
Although recognizing the realities of modem family structures is an
admirable goal, implementing an unadulterated functionally based ap-
proach must nevertheless provide a feasible method for determining child
status. There must be definitive criteria for establishing child status. For
instance, many adults have relationships with children that, although
close, are not the sort of relationships that rise to parent-child status.280
Therefore, a showing that the decedent simply took an individual into his
or her home would not be sufficient. 281
273. See id. at 31-32.
274. Id. at 72.
275. Id.
276. Of course, the vast majority of individuals who satisfy this framework would be
related by blood or adoption.
277. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 255, at 7; Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene:
Judicial Assumptions about Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637, 690-94 (1993); Carolyn
Wilkes Kaas, Breaking Up a Family or Putting It Back Together Again: Refining the Prefer-
ence in Favor of the Parent in Third-Party Custody Cases, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1045,
1090 (1996); Lucy S. McGough & Lawrence M. Shindell, Coming of Age: The Best Inter-
ests of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209, 241-
44 (1978); Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 249, at 1643-50.
278. See Polikoff, supra note 8, at 58; R. Alto Charo, Biological Determinism in Legal
Decision Making: The Parent Trap, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 265, 267-68 (1994).
279. See Polikoff, supra note 8, at 58.
280. Gary, supra note 52, at 683.
281. Id.
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Accordingly, to determine child status for inheritance purposes, courts
would be required to evaluate the nature and strength of the relationship
between the decedent and child by considering a variety of factors that
the statute considers relevant.2 82 In order to establish child status, clear
and convincing evidence of a parent-child relationship from the property
owner's perspective would be dispositive. Factors a court must consider
are: (i) whether the decedent held him/herself out to be a parent of the
child for a substantial period of time28 3 (if the decedent died while the
child was in gestation, such time could include the pregnancy of a partner
or surrogate mother or the time and effort spent during which ART is
procured 284); (ii) whether benefits of love and affection accrued to the
child;285 (iii) whether the parent-child relationship was publicly recog-
nized 286 (which could include the period while the child was in gestation);
(iv) whether the decedent desired to have the rights afforded to a parent;
and (v) whether the decedent performed obligations of parenthood for a
substantial period of time.28 7 These factors should be interpreted broadly
because functioning as a parent will be different depending on the partic-
ular family structure.
The unadulterated functionally based approach to defining child status
would be applicable for class gift purposes as well. If the dispositive in-
struments were silent, a functional relationship would be determinative
for both instruments executed by the property owner referring to his or
her children and for instruments executed by the property owner refer-
ring to another's children. In In re Estate of Coe,288 a case involving the
stranger to the adoption rule, the court stated that:
We cannot believe it probable that strangers to the adoption would
differentiate between the natural child and the adopted child of an-
other. Rather we believe it more likely that they accept the relation-
ships established by the parent whether the bond be natural or by
adoption and seek to advance those relationships precisely as that
parent would. None of us discriminates among children of a relative
282. For efficiency purposes, and because most children would fall into the blood or
adopted category, I would propose a rebuttable presumption of a parent-child relationship
in cases of genetic children and adopted children. This presumption could be overcome
where there is no functional relationship. Potential exclusion for lack of a genetic tie or
adoption could be overcome by a functional showing.
283. Gary, supra note 3, at 73. Some scholars advocate that the relationship form in the
tender years of the child. See id. I understand the formative implications of this from a
family law perspective but do not see the relevance from a property law perspective.
284. See Woodhouse, supra note 7, at a (describing what she terms as "gestational fa-
thering" in showing that functionalism would include fathering activities during pregnancy
or perhaps surrogacy; therefore, if the property owner died during the child's gestation, the
child could still inherit from the deceased property owner because functionalism would be
interpreted broadly enough to include parental actions and intent before the birth of the
child).
285. Gary, supra note 3, at 76.
286. Robinson, supra note 85, at 985.
287. Robinson, supra note 85, at 985-86. For other factors advocated by scholars, see
Gary, supra note 3, at 73-80; Robinson, supra note 85, at 983-88.
288. 201 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1964).
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or friend based upon a biological basis .... We ought not impute to
others instincts contrary to our own.289
Likewise, in Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Hanes,2 90 a case
interpreting child status for class gift purposes, the West Virginia court
opined that:
While there may be testators and trustors who are so concerned
with medieval concepts of 'bloodline' and 'heirs of the body' that
they would truly be upset at the thought that their hard-won assets
would one day pass into hands of persons not of their blood, we can-
not formulate general rules of law for the benefit of eccentrics.291
In following the wisdom of these courts, class gifts would apply the un-
adulterated functionally based approach to defining child status.
For posthumously conceived children, in the absence of a testamentary-
type document providing otherwise, 292 the default rule should be that
such a child does not inherit from the deceased genetic donor because the
child did not "survive" 293 the decedent, nor was there a functional parent-
child relationship.2 94 Of course, if the decedent expresses the intent in a
testamentary-type instrument that such a child should inherit, the testa-
tor's intent should be honored if such child was born within a prescribed
period of time as to not delay the administration of the estate for too long
a period. 295
Professor Follows once opined that "[d]onative transfer law ... does
not accomplish the property owner's will, but accomplishes only the prop-
erty owner's will as the state identifies it."' 296 Under an unadulterated
functionally based approach however, succession laws will mirror more
closely the property owner's actual intent, thereby furthering testamen-
tary freedom.
289. Id. at 575.
290. 237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977).
291. Id. at 503.
292. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West 2008).
293. UPC § 2-103 states that "[a]ny part of the intestate estate not passing to a dece-
dent's surviving spouse ... passes in the following order to the individuals ... who survive
the decedent" (emphasis added). See also, Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961,
966 (D. Ariz. 2002) (stating that the requirement that an heir must survive a decedent is
"indicative that [he or she] must be in existence at the time of the decedent's death").
294. This is consistent with several multi-disciplinary task forces' conclusions concern-
ing posthumously conceived children. Three groups have recommended legislation that
would preclude a child conceived after its parent's death from inheriting: 1) the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (in 1988); 2) the New York State
Task Force on Life and the Law (in 1998); and 3) the American Bar Association's Commit-
tee on Laws of Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Genetics (in 1999). For a thor-
ough discussion on posthumously conceived children and inheritance, see Kirstine S.
Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father's Last Will, 46 ARIz. L. REV. 91 (2004).
295. Requiring a testamentary-type instrument would fulfill the cautionary, evidentiary,
and protective functions of will act formalities concerning gratuitous transfers at death.
For a discussion of these policy issues, see DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 11, at
200-01.
296. Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611 (1988).
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C. THE 2008 UPC AMENDMENTS (OR, THE
KITCHEN SINK APPROACH)
The 2008 UPC Amendments are a great step in the direction of ex-
panding the definition of parent-child relationships for property succes-
sion purposes. The drafters of the 2008 UPC Amendments do a valiant
job in tackling complicated issues concerning blended stepfamilies and
children born of ART. The result, however, seems overly complicated
and ideologically inconsistent. The kitchen sink approach, adopted by
the 2008 UPC Amendments, retains the sanguinary nexus definition of
children based on blood or a presumption thereof as the seminal building
block for child status, but expands the definition by including: (i) children
of an adjudicated legal parent; (ii) adopted children; (iii) a limited excep-
tion for step-parent and interfamily adopted children and children
adopted after both genetic parents have died; (iv) non-marital children;
(v) children born of ART where there is documented parental intent; (vi)
children born of ART where there is functional parenting; and (vii) equi-
tably adopted children. 297
Although the 2008 UPC Amendments add a plethora of new categories
of "child" to existing law,2 9 8 the kitchen sink approach does not redefine
the parent-child status for inheritance law. The kitchen sink approach is
merely an effort to increase the number of potential child intestate share
beneficiaries. The overarching public policy rationale behind these revi-
sions is that when it comes to inheritance by potential children, simply
put, the more the merrier. This over-inclusive policy is wholly inconsis-
tent with the jurisprudential underpinnings of property law, testamentary
freedom, and portions of the 2008 UPC Amendments themselves. How-
ever, it is in lockstep with child-based policy rationales drawn from family
law. Thus, the drafters of the 2008 UPC Amendments have erroneously
accepted child-based policy rationales plucked from family law as gospel
in dealing with property law issues.
In revising the definition of parent-child relationships, the drafters of
the 2008 UPC Amendments borrowed heavily from the Uniform Parent-
age Act (UPA). The UPA provides rules for determining a parent-child
relationship for legal purposes in order to determine, among other things,
family law issues, such as identifying who will be making decisions con-
cerning the minor child's well being and who will be providing support.29 9
Relying on the UPA to establish child status for inheritance purposes,
however, is suspect. The UPA was created and is maintained to establish
legal parentage for family law purposes-acting in the best interest of the
child. As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted in In re Estate of
297. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-116-2-122 (amended 2008). For good measure, there is
also a behavioral aspect to defining parentage under UPC § 2-114, but behavioralism in
only applied in a child-centered manner. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114.
298. The 2008 UPC Amendments replace one section of the earlier code that defined a
parent-child relationship with eight sections. It would take at least five pages of this Arti-
cle just to reproduce the new sections that define a parent-child relationship.
299. See UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, Preemptory Note (2002).
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Palmer:3oo
The Parentage Act and the Probate Code are independent statutes
designed to address different primary rights. The purpose of the Par-
entage Act is to establish "the legal relationship ... between a child
and the child's natural or adoptive parents, incident to which the law
confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations." Child
support is the major concern under the Parentage Act. The purpose
of the Probate Code, on the other hand, is to determine the devolu-
tion of a decedent's real and personal property. 301
1. Genetic Parents
The 2008 UPC Amendments keep genetics as the foundation for estab-
lishing a parent-child relationship. 30 2 Under UPC Section 2-117, a "par-
ent-child relationship exists between a child and the child's genetic
parents, regardless of their marital status," unless an individual is in-
cluded or excluded as a parent under one of the other sections.30 3 This
Section overturns the common law rule that denied inheritance to non-
marital children. 30 4
UPC Section 2-115 defines "genetic mother" as "the woman whose egg
was fertilized by the sperm of the child's genetic father. ' 30 5 Genetic fa-
ther is defined as "the man whose sperm fertilized the egg of the genetic
mother" or if a presumption of paternity exists under applicable state
law.30 6 Generally, paternity is presumed if before the child reaches the
age of two, the father and child live in the same household and the father
openly holds the child out as his natural child, or if the father files a writ-
ten acknowledgement of paternity with the appropriate court or adminis-
trative agency. 307 If neither of these requirements is satisfied, the child
300. 658 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 2003). See also Wingate v. Estate of Ryan, 693 A.2d 457
(N.J. 1997) (describing the separate rationales for the probate code and parentage act).
301. In re Estate of Palmer, 698 N.W.2d at 200.
302. UPC § 2-117 (amended 2008).
303. Id.
304. At common law, a child born out of wedlock was filius nullius-the child of no
one. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 434 ("[T]he incapacity of a bastard
consists principally in this, that he cannot be heir to any one, on the Laws of England in
Fair Books, neither can he have heirs, but of his own body; for, being nullius filius, he is
therefore of kin to nobody, and has no ancestor from whom any inheritance blood can be
derived."). The consequence of such classification was that the child had no inheritance
rights-from either the mother or father. HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND
SOCIAL POLICY 25 (1971). In most American jurisdictions, non-marital children have
long been able to inherit from their mothers, but not their fathers. Id. In a series of Su-
preme Court cases, the Court recognized the legal relationship between parents and their
non-marital children. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 762 (1977) (holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from imposing an absolute bar to inheritance
under intestacy statutes by non-marital children). For a detailed review of the Supreme
Court cases, see Laurence C. Nolan, "Unwed Children" and Their Parents Before the
United States Supreme Court From Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Constitu-
tional Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (1999).
305. UPC § 2-115(6) (proposed 2008 Amendments).
306. UPC § 2-115(5) (proposed 2008 Amendments).
307. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5) (2000).
[Vol. 62
HeinOnline  -- 62 S.M.U. L. Rev. 408 2009
Parent-Child Property Succession
has the burden of proving a parent-child relationship. 30 8
2. Adoptive Parents
UPC Sections 2-118 and 2-119 focus on adopted children. 30 9 Under the
UPC, an adoptive child is the child of the adopting parents and not of the
child's biological parents.310 For intestacy purposes, adoption cuts off the
right of inheritance as between the adopted child and the biological rela-
tives, thereby effectuating the "fresh start" policy.311 This policy
manifests the belief that it is in the best interest of a child to sever emo-
tional and financial ties with the biological parents to facilitate the crea-
tion of new ties with the adoptive parents.312
The UPC 2008 Amendments, however, provide exceptions to the fresh
308. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 201(b) (2000).
The father-child relationship is established between a man and a child by: (1)
an unrebutted presumption of the man's paternity of the child under Section
204; (2) an effective acknowledgement of paternity by the man under [Arti-
cle] 3, unless the acknowledgement has been rescinded or successfully chal-
lenged; (3) an adjudication of the man's paternity; (4) adoption of the child
by the man; [or] (5) the man's having consented to assisted reproduction by a
woman under [Article] 7 which resulted in the birth of the child [;] or (6) an
adjudication conferring the man as a parent of a child born to a gestational
mother if the agreement was validated under [Article] 8 or is enforceable
under other law].
Id.
309. The recent UPC amendments still do not adequately address the emerging issue of
second-parent adoptions by gay and lesbian couples and the interplay with state marriage
or partnership laws. Amended UPC §§ 2-705 and 2-118-19 limit the right of adopted chil-
dren to adopt from their genetic parents. The previous UPC rule merely prohibited
adopted children from inheriting from their natural parents. See UPC 2-118 Comment. The
new rules, codified at § 2-118 and 2-119, refer only to the rights of adoptees to inherit from
a genetic parent in limited cases where the genetic parent's spouse is adopting the adoptee.
In states where gay marriage is not recognized, the UPC amendment would seem to limit
the child from adopting from one of her parents. For example, if the genetic mother in a
lesbian couple wishes her partner to adopt the child, the genetic mother risks her child
being unable to inherit from the genetic mother because this scenario does not fit one of
the exceptions to the 2-119 (a) severing the parent-child relationship between an adoptee
and the adoptee' genetic parents. The 2008 UPC amendments rely on each particular
state's definition of "spouse" to define intestacy and inheritance rights. This latent conse-
quence is characteristic of rules that needlessly add complexity to spell out every possible
adoption scenario rather than looking instead at who functioned as a parent to the child.
Adopting the functionally based approach would resolve this issue by avoiding use of state
marriage laws to determine the inheritance rights of adopted children where the state mar-
riage laws would likely frustrate the intent of the second (non-genetic) parent.
310. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-118(a) and 2-119(a) (proposed 2008 Amendments).
311. See In re Estates of Donnelly, 502 P.2d 1163, 1166-67 (Wash. 1978) (stating that the
broad objective of the 'overlapping adoption and inheritance statutes" as "giving the
adopted child a 'fresh start' by treating him as the natural child of the adoptive parent, and
severing all ties with the past").
312. See Rein, supra note 77, at 717 ("[S]ociety generally deems it in the adoptee's best
interests to make him a full-fledged member of his adoptive family. This assimilation can
occur only if the adopting family treats the adoptee in all respects, including matters of
succession, as though he had been born into his adoptive family. Furthermore, it is appar-
ent that an adoptee's retention of ties with his biological family can undermine the psycho-
logical aspect of this assimilation.").
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start policy by allowing a child adopted by a step-parent,313 adopted by a
relative or spouse or surviving spouse of a relative, 314 or adopted after
the death of both genetic parents, 315 to inherit from or through a biologi-
cal parent who either is deceased or has given up parental rights.316 The
child will inherit from or through that genetic parent even if the parent
terminated legal parentage, had no relationship with the child, or had a
new family. Therefore, under this statute, an adopted child has the possi-
bility of inheriting from more than two parents. The fresh start excep-
tions are not, however, extended to second parent adoptions. 317 For
instance, a genetic parent will cease to be a parent for intestacy purposes
if his or her unmarried partner adopts the child.
In addition, the 2000 UPC Amendments create a parent-child relation-
ship between an individual and child that is in the process of being
adopted by the individual. This relationship is created in two circum-
stances: (i) when a child is in the process of being adopted by a married
couple when one of the spouses dies and if the adoption is subsequently
granted to the decedent's surviving spouse; and (ii) if a stepparent is in
the process of adopting the child when the stepparent dies and the step-
parent's spouse survived the deceased stepparent by 120 hours. 318 The
UPC however, does not define what "in the process" constitutes. Note
that there could be a situation where a parent-child relationship exists for
inheritance purposes but not for legal purposes.
3. Children Conceived by ART
The 2008 UPC Amendments create new sections that redefine a par-
ent-child relationship concerning children conceived by ART.319 The text
is complex, filled with exceptions, and cloaked in language only a lawyer
could love. When taken together, these additions recognize parentage
based upon intent. That is, the individuals who, at the time of conception,
intended to raise the child will be deemed to be the child's parents. These
sections are gender neutral and generally marital status neutral, therefore
adding protections to same-sex and opposite sex unmarried couples.
313. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(b) (proposed 2008 Amendments). For example,
consider if a child's biological married parents divorced. If the child's mother remarries
and the child's new step-father adopts the child, the UPC allows the child to not only
inherit from his or her mother and newly adopted father, but also from and through his
biological father.
314. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(c) (proposed 2008 Amendments). Relative is de-
fined as a grandparent or descendant of a grandparent of the child. Id.
315. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(d) (proposed 2008 Amendments). This statute ap-
plies regardless of whether the genetic parent's family has any relationship with the child.
316. Note, however, that the genetic parent who is no longer legal parent, and the ge-
netic parent's family, will not be able to inherit from or through the child. This lack of
reciprocity demonstrates the child-centered nature of the 2008 UPC Amendments.
317. A second parent adoption is when a person not married to the genetic parent
adopts the genetic parent's child without terminating the legal relationship between the
genetic parent and the child. See Gary, supra note 52, at 659.
318. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-118(b) (proposed 2008 Amendments).
319. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-120, 2-121 (proposed 2008 Amendments).
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The 2008 UPC Amendments divide the definition of a parent-child re-
lationship for children conceived by ART into two sections. Section 2-
120 deals with children born other than to a gestational mother (i.e.,
where the birth mother is either the genetic parent or intended par-
ent).320 Section 2-121 deals with children born to a gestational mother
(i.e., where the birth mother is someone who is not the intended parent
or genetic parent but who gives birth to a child under a gestational
agreement). 321
a. Child Conceived by ART Other than Child Born to Gestational
Carrier
For a child conceived by ART other than a child born to a gestational
mother, a parent-child relationship exists between the child and the
child's birth mother.322 A parent-child relationship also exists between
the child and the husband of the birth mother if the husband provided the
sperm and the sperm was used during the husband's lifetime.323 There is
no parent-child relationship between a third party donor (an individual
who produces eggs or sperm used for assisted reproduction, regardless of
whether the donation was anonymous or arranged privately or for consid-
eration) and a child unless the donor was: (i) a husband who provides
sperm or a wife who provides eggs; (ii) the birth mother of the child; (iii)
an individual identified on the birth certificate as a parent; (iv) an individ-
ual who consented to assisted reproduction with intent to be treated as
the other parent if a signed record evidences the individual's consent; or
(v) an individual who functioned 324 as a parent of the child no later than
two years after the child's birth.325 In addition, a parent-child relation-
ship can be established by an individual (other than the birth mother)
who provided no genetic material if: (i) the individual consented to as-
sisted reproduction by the birth mother with intent to be treated as the
other parent if a signed record evidences the individual's consent; or (ii)
the individual functioned as a parent of the child no later than two years
after the child's birth.
320. § 2-120.
321. § 2-121.
322. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(c) (proposed 2008 Amendments). If the child con-
ceived by ART is adopted, then the adoption sections would govern. See UNIF. PROBATE
CODE §§ 2-118, 2-119 (proposed 2008 Amendments).
323. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(d) (proposed 2008 Amendments).
324. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-115(4) (proposed 2008 Amendments) defines "func-
tioned as a parent of the child" as:
behaving toward the child in a manner consistent with being the child's par-
ent and performing functions that are customarily performed by a parent,
such as fulfilling parental responsibilities toward the child, recognizing or
holding out the child as the individual's child, materially participating in the
child's upbringing, and residing with the child in the same household as regu-
lar members of that household.
325. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(a)(3), (e), (f) (proposed 2008 Amendments). Note
that there is no time period in which an individual has to function as a parent.
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If placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos is undertaken by a married
couple and no divorce proceeding is pending, it is presumed that both
spouses consented to having a parent-child relationship with the resulting
child. 326 If a marriage is dissolved before such placement, the resulting
child is not the child of the former spouse unless there is a signed consent
to be the child's parent, even if the child is born after divorce.32 7
A posthumously conceived child will be treated as the child of the de-
ceased individual if: (i) the individual intended to be treated as a parent
of a posthumously conceived child is established by clear and convincing
evidence, 328 and (ii) the child is in utero no later than thirty-six months
after the decedent's death or born no later than forty-five months after
the individual's death.32 9
b. Child Conceived by ART Other than Child Born to Gestational
Carrier
With respect to children born to a gestational mother, the child will be
the child of the intended parents330 and not of the gestational mother.331
Intent alone is not sufficient. A parent-child relationship only exists if the
intended parent functioned as a parent of the child no later than two
years after the child's birth or died while the gestational carrier was
pregnant. 332
4. Behavior
Under the 2008 UPC Amendments, a parent will not inherit from a
child if parental rights were terminated. 333 In addition, a parent is pre-
cluded from inheriting from a child if a parent's parental rights could
have been terminated on the basis of nonsupport, abandonment, abuse,
neglect, or other actions or inactions towards the child.334 Note that
there is no behavioral exception for a child to inherit from his or her
parent, regardless of how the child treated the parent.
326. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(h) (proposed 2008 Amendments).
327. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(i) (proposed 2008 Amendments). Consent can be
withdrawn before placement. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1200) (proposed 2008
Amendments).
328. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(1)(C) (proposed 2008 Amendments).
329. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) (proposed 2008 Amendments).
330. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(d). If the child conceived by ART is adopted, then
the adoption sections would govern. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-118, 2-119 (proposed
2008 Amendments).
331. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-121(c) (proposed 2008 Amendments). A parent-child
relationship, however, can be established by a Gestational Mother if (i) the individual is
designated a parent in a court order, or (ii) the individual is also the genetic mother and a
parent-child relationship does not exist otherwise. Id.
332. UNWF. PROBATE CODE § 2-121(d) (proposed 2008 Amendments).
333. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (proposed 2008 Amendments).
334. Id.
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5. Equitable Adoption
The UPC 2008 Amendments do not affect the doctrine of equitable
adoption.33
5
D. 2008 UPC AMENDMENTS APPROACH VS. UNADULTERATED
FUNCTIONALLY BASED APPROACH
In some ways, the outcomes resulting from application of the unadul-
terated functionally based approach might seem substantially similar to
the outcomes resulting from the kitchen sink approach. However, these
two approaches are as different as night and day. Completely breaking
the genetic link in determining child status and focusing on the rights of
the property owner, rather than the interest of the child, creates a radi-
cally different outcome. Therefore, a quick comparison of the two ap-
proaches is in order.
1. Expansion of Class vs. Redefinition of Status
The most obvious and pertinent difference between the approaches
concerns whether succession law should continue its devotion to genetic
relationships. The 2008 UPC Amendments are more aligned with the
formal approach to defining a parent-child relationship than a true intent-
based or functionally based approach because the Amendments continue
to treat genetic relationships as special.
Despite all the hyperbole about intent and functionalism, the 2008
UPC Amendments do not seek to redefine parent-child relationships for
inheritance purposes, but simply intend to increase the class of potential
takers, "squeezing" more children into the child status category. 336
Redefining a parent-child relationship might have the effect of excluding
some children currently included in the definition.337 The kitchen sink
approach only recognizes parental intent or functionally based relation-
ships to increase the potential pool of takers, but it does not recognize the
lack of intent or functionalism as a means of shrinking the pool of poten-
tial takers.
2. Complex and Inconsistent
The fixation on providing for as many children as possible has created a
complicated, inconsistent system. The 2008 UPC Amendments lack a co-
herent ideology of what should constitute a parent-child relationship for
property succession purposes. The UPC creates one structure for defin-
ing child status that advocates the sanguinary nexus test, and it confus-
ingly relies both on genetics and other structures that disregard genetics
335. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-122 (proposed 2008 Amendments).
336. See Gary, supra note 3, at 60 (opining that the formal approach used in a Califor-
nia statute concerning stepchild "does not attempt to incorporate new family structures,
but rather seeks to squeeze the new family structures into existing rules.").
337. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-116-2-121 (proposed 2008 Amendments).
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(intent to parent, functional parenting, behavioral parenting, and contrac-
tual parenting). If intent to parent is important, why is it ignored in the
case of genetic children that were accidentally conceived or conceived
through forced intercourse? If functionalism is important, why do the
statutes retain a genetics aspect-why not just implement functionalism?
For defining parentage, the 2008 UPC Amendments at times rely upon
legal parentage concepts and at other times ignore it. Similarly, at times
the UPC acknowledges that a certain category of child may have multiple
parents, and other times it seems to indicate that the greatest number of
parents a child could have is two. By avoiding redefining the parent-child
relationship, the kitchen sink approach creates a cumbersome and con-
fusing system.
The unadulterated functionally based approach offers a unified, com-
prehensive, and flexible approach to establishing child status. This ap-
proach looks at each potential parent-child relationship and determines
whether the parties performed parent-child roles and whether the "par-
ent" in the relationship considered the other to be a "child. '338 By re-
specting the changing dynamics of family structures, this approach can be
applied to all of the parent-child status issues arising from ART and the
evolving nature of families. It redefines parent-child relationships and
places all families, of whatever structure, on equal footing.
3. Child-Centered Perspective vs. Property Owner Centered Perspective
A critical outcome determinative difference between the two ap-
proaches is the perspective from which the parent-child test is to be ap-
plied. The scholars advocating kitchen sink type approaches not only
adopted concepts of parentage from family law, but also adopted the
mantra of family law as well. The 2008 UPC Amendments analyze the
parent-child relationship from a child-centered view. Advocates look to a
type of fairness doctrine 339 from the point of view of the child in incorpo-
rating functionality into the parent-child relationship. Proponents pull at
the heartstrings by painting a desperate picture of needy infants being
denied inheritance, as opposed to a financially successful adult child.
Succession law is, and should be, focused on the property owner. 340 If
providing for one's child at death implements the dispositive wishes of
the average intestate decedent, fulfilling this goal should be property
owner centered rather than child-centered. Defining a parent-child rela-
tionship from a best interest of a child perspective does not achieve the
338. See, e.g., Gary, supra note 3, at 73-80; Robinson, supra note 85, at 983-88.
339. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 67, at 1035 (noting that some estates law scholars as-
sert that "formulating intestacy laws should also take into account the pattern of distribu-
tion that survivors would consider fair"); Brashier, supra note 6, at 1 n.1 ("Although this
Article does examine the adequacy of probate laws from the standpoint of 'fairness' to the
child in a nontraditional family, the Article is principally concerned with incongruities and
the overall lack of certainty presented by current inheritance schemes as applied to such a
child.").
340. This Article does not debate whether child support obligations should survive a
parent's death and become a debt of the estate.
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traditional goals of inheritance laws-the focus in succession law is on the
property owner and not on the expectations of surviving family
members.341
Because the drafters of the 2008 UPC Amendments borrowed heavily
from the UPA and family law, the 2008 UPC Amendments unnecessarily
focus on determining parentage at the date of the child's birth, or shortly
thereafter (except for adoption). For instance, the UPC borrows the
UPA's definition of parentage for ART purposes by looking to parental
intent.342 Intent to parent for ART purposes is important to family law
because date of birth decisions must be made. Property law does not
have that concern. Because the test for finding aparent-child relationship
seems fixed at a child's birth, many parent-child relationships will be pre-
cluded under the new statutes.
In addition, the kitchen sink approach seems to foster the notion that
the traditional two parent family framework is the preferred family unit
(although potentially allowing for the recognition of more than two par-
ents for some adopted children). Scholars cringe at the perceived unfair-
ness that a child might inherit from more than two parents-by all means,
children from a traditional family can only inherit from two.343 From a
family law perspective, it might be advantageous to limit the number of
adults who take part in making decisions for a minor child. But there is
no reason from a property law perspective to advance this two-parent
structure. Children born to a single parent inherit under the intestacy
statutes from one parent, not two-this doesn't seem to be unjust. Con-
versely, some children might inherit from parents and uncles and aunts
under the intestacy statutes, while others do not.
Under the unadulterated functionally based approach, there is no pre-
sumption that a child must have one mother and one father-it bases
child status solely on the relationship of the decedent to the child. 344
There is no reference to the child's mother or father, but only to the
child's parents. Under certain circumstances, a child may have only one
parent or may have more than two parents. In addition, under the un-
adulterated functionally based approach, there are no gender restrictions
341. Mahoney, supra note 69, at 939.
342. Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-115 (proposed 2008 amendments), with UNIF.
PARENTAGE Acr § 102.
343. Scholars view this type of "double dipping" as inequitable. See, e.g., Brashier,
supra note 6, at 145 ("perhaps inheritance from three or more parents is improper under
any circumstances"); Rein, supra note 79, at 725 (stating that dual sources of inheritance
affords an individual advantages denied biological children).
344. Some family law commentators have argued for an expanded definition of parent-
age by advocating simultaneous recognition of genetic, gestational, and intentional parents.
See R. Alta Charo, And Baby Makes Three-or Four, or Five, or Six: Redefining Family
after the Reprotech Revolution, 15 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 231, 252-53 (2000). For other arti-
cles opining about the possibility of a child having more than two parent-like figures, see
Bartlett, supra note 7; Gilbert A. Homes, The Tie that Binds: The Constitutional Right to
Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 385-411 (1994);
Janet L. Richards, Redefining Parenthood: Parental Rights Versus Child Rights, 40 WAYNE
L. REV. 1227, 1270-71 (1994).
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on defining parentage and, thus, a child could have multiple male or fe-
male parents. For instance, if a gay man in a homosexual relationship
donated sperm to a married female friend whose husband was infertile
with the understanding that all would participate in the child's life, the
child could potentially inherit from all four parents.
Also, the 2008 UPC Amendments continue to look to a spouse or part-
ner of the birth mother to define a parent-child relationship. 345 In other
words, a father can establish a relationship with a child through the fa-
ther's relationship with the child's mother.346 Under the unadulterated
functionally based approach, this is unnecessary because each relation-
ship is analyzed independently.
Clearly, shifting the focus from a child-centered view to a property
owner centered view will more fully encapsulate true donative intent
while removing estates law from the culture wars raging in family law.
The questions concerning whether children can, or should, form attach-
ments to one or more parents or whether alternative parents are appro-
priate role models are irrelevant for succession law purposes. Under this
proposed model, an individual may be held to be a legal parent for child
support purposes, but that individual and child may not have a parent-
child relationship for inheritance purposes. Such a model would re-
center the focus back to the property owner, where it belongs, while still
recognizing the changing parent-child relationships and furthering estab-
lished estates law jurisprudence.
4. Equity
While intestacy statutes reflect social norms and values, they also shape
the norms and values by recognizing and legitimating relationships. 347
Keeping the definitions of "natural" and "others" fails to adequately ad-
dress the larger discriminatory message. By keeping the sanguinary
nexus test, the kitchen sink approach fosters the idea that genetic chil-
dren born of sexual intercourse are of superior child status to others and
continues to relegate those outside of the genetic family to second-class
status.348 "Even though we recognize that there are, in a literal sense,
differences of one kind or another, we suppress these differences or inex-
actitudes, because the points of convergence are far more important...
than the points of divergence. '349
345. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-115(5), 2-120(c) (proposed 2008
amendments).
346. See DOLG IN, supra note 256, at 98 (distinguishing between the notion that "fathers
become fathers because they establish relationships with their children" and the more con-
servative notion that "fathers become fathers because they are connected to the mothers of
their children").
347. Fellows, supra note 57, at 8.
348. E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-
Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063, 1088 (1999).
349. Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1215, 1218
(1998). Professor Schauer explains that:
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When defining parent-child relationships for inheritance purposes, the
differences between sexual and ART conception are irrelevant to the val-
ues and policy goals that underlie the choice of the standard for defining
child status. Inheritance laws regulate property distribution upon the
property owner's death, not the mechanics of conception. What matters
are the relationships that ultimately result. Because the end result-the
parent-child relationship-is the same regardless of the conception tech-
nique used, consistency demands similar treatment. Because the same
relationship possibilities are available in cases of ART, sexual conception,
or family structure, the differences between these methods should not be
determinative. There should be no difference in how to determine rela-
tionships for ART versus natural conception. 350 Unless there is a justifia-
ble basis for distinguishing technological conception from these other
methods of achieving parentage, fairness demands that status be deter-
mined by similar legal standards.
The unadulterated functionally based approach would assimilate tech-
nological conception and modern family structures within contemporary
estates law. The proposed standards would base child status on actual
relationships instead of the circumstances of a child's conception. The
unadulterated approach offers the benefit of neutrality. It treats all par-
ents and children equally, without regard to the parent's choice of
method of becoming a parent.
5. Child Support vs. Donative Intent
Because of the 2008 UPC Amendments' child-centered focus, child
support jurisprudence seems elevated above testamentary freedom. 35 1
There is a tendency to think of intestate succession as a form of child
support, whether the child is a minor or adult, or whether the child is
needy or financially successful.35 2 Advocating this rationale as the over-
arching concern of inheritance law, however, is rooted neither in the na-
ture nor the history of inheritance law.
[C]laims of identity, likeness, exactness, and sameness ... are not ordinarily
claims of literal equality in all respects, or even in all potentially relevant
respects, but rather they are claims that people should be treated the same in
some number of respects because they are the same in some, but clearly not
in all, respects.
Id. at 1219.
350. Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 250, at 1641. A dissatisfaction with
solely relying upon blood ties arises from a concern that not all biological families are
loving. See T.A. Tucker Ronzetti, Comment, Constituting Family and Death Through the
Struggle with State Power: Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 149, 174-75 (1991) (stating that "the family can be-and often is-the locus
of violence and sexual abuse, hidden from view all the more effectively because it is
deemed private").
351. While I do believe parents have an obligation to support minor or disabled chil-
dren, I am not convinced that property law is the proper and most efficient venue to imple-
ment this obligation.
352. See Gary, supra note 3, at 72 (basing her proposal on two policies: approximation
of decedent's intent and support for families, however formed).
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There is a fundamental difference between intestate succession and
child support, inasmuch as no parent is under a legal obligation to leave
his or her children anything, and there is no "right to inherit. '353 In fact,
the testamentary freedom doctrine values the right of the testator to com-
pletely disinherit his or her adult children. 354 In addition, succession law
historically has, and continues to, provide limited and narrow support to a
decedent's child, and this meager support is only offered to minor
children. 355
As a result of the child-centered focus to intestate succession, current
treatment of testate and intestate estates is incongruent from a policy
standpoint. This bipolar treatment is evident in the kitchen sink ap-
proach, as adopted in the 2008 UPC Amendments. The 2008 UPC
Amendments automatically give a child with only a genetic relationship
to a decedent an intestate share based upon a support rationale, yet it
does not extend this rationale by allowing a child with a genetic relation-
ship to a testator to take a forced share if the testator has executed a
will.356 To be consistent, any statutory scheme would have to either: (i)
allow children with only a genetic link to a decedent to take an intestate
share in tandem with allowing children with only a genetic link to a testa-
tor to take a forced share sufficient to support the child, or (ii) deny a
child with solely a genetic link to a decedent an intestate share alongside
denial of a forced share to a child with solely a genetic link to a testator.
To illustrate the point, assume father Thorton passes away leaving son
Jason, whom Thorton fathered unintentionally. After Thorton dies, a
consistent statutory scheme that awarded Jason an intestate share based
solely on his genetic connection would also have to allow Jason to take a
forced share if Thorton died testate and disinherited Jason. Since Jason's
intestate share is based on a support theory, for consistency's sake, he
would need to be entitled to similar support via a forced share if Thorton
attempted to disinherit Jason. Moreover, a consistent statutory scheme
that denied Jason a forced share if Thorton attempted to disinherit him
would also need to deny Jason an intestate share based solely on his ge-
netic relationship to Thorton.
In rationalizing support theory, scholars bifurcate succession jurispru-
dence between testate and intestate estates. Some scholars note that sup-
port theory can trump testamentary freedom for intestacy laws because
the decedent forfeited his or her rights by not executing a will. For in-
353. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 11, at 62 (stating that the interest
of an heir apparent is a "mere expectancy" and is "not a legal 'interest' at all").
354. Hernandez, supra note 1, at 980; Friedman, supra note 9, at 15 (theorizing that the
ease in which an individual may disinherit his or her own children is perhaps reflective of
the respect American law has to the doctrine of testamentary freedom).
355. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-402, 2-402A (2000) (homestead allowance); 2-
404 (2000) (maintenance allowance); 2-403 (2000) (exempt property allowance).
356. Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-117 (proposed 2008 Amendments) (treating a
child with solely a genetic link to an intestate decedent as a child for the purposes of
intestate succession) with UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101(b) (2000) (allowing disinheritance
of a child with a genetic link to a testate decedent).
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stance, Professor Gary notes that the "tension between testamentary
freedom and succession within the family does not exist when a decedent
dies intestate because the decedent has not exercised the available testa-
mentary freedom. '357
Diminishing testamentary freedom for intestacy purposes however,
does not seem justified. First, it ignores the notion that intestacy furthers
testamentary intent by giving an individual the right not to execute a will
but still have his or her property pass to intended takers. Otherwise, the
default rules of intestacy would have a harsh effect on many individu-
als. 358 Many individuals might not have adequate knowledge concerning
the laws of succession or the mental acumen to create a valid will. In
states that do not allow holographic wills, this becomes more problem-
atic. In addition, it forces individuals to hire lawyers to draft wills, which
many individuals might not be able to afford. Denying those without
proper knowledge or resources the right to testamentary freedom seems
draconian. Before adopting a penalty-incorporating default system for
intestacy laws,35 9 better justifications must be given.
Second, diminishing testamentary freedom for intestacy purposes ad-
versely affects testamentary freedom for testacy purposes because the
two structures are interconnected. Intestacy statutes are used for a vari-
ety of purposes. 360 Most importantly, intestacy statutes define "child" for
class gift purposes under dispositive instruments.361 It seems counterin-
tuitive that the underlying principle of estates law would be diminished in
intestacy if intestacy statutes influence the construction and interpreta-
tion of wills.
6. No Surprises
Currently, an individual can bring a claim against his or her alleged
father's estate in the absence of any acknowledgement or adjudication of
paternity during the decedent's lifetime, even when the decedent did not
know he may have fathered a child. 362 Allowing these claims causes de-
lays in the probate process and confusion, undue grief, and surprise to a
surviving family.
Consider for example, the following situation. Marty, a man, and
Wanda, a woman, have a very brief relationship. After the relationship is
over, and unbeknownst to Marty, Wanda has a child, Chuck, born of the
relationship. Marty later marries and has children from the marriage.
Chuck grows to adulthood with his mother and his mother's family never
knowing of his father's identity. Chuck becomes quite successful. Marty
357. Gary, supra note 3, at 10.
358. Fellows, supra note 57, at 323-24 (stating that if the intestacy statutes did not con-
form to the likely wishes of a person who dies without a will, it would create a trap for the
ignorant or misinformed).
359. Hirsch, supra note 67, at 1058.
360. See supra notes 60, 61, 62 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
362. Gary, supra note 52, at 654.
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dies, at which time Wanda tells Chuck of his father's identity. Marty died
intestate. If Chuck could establish that he was Marty's genetic child by
DNA evidence, Chuck could claim a share of Marty's estate. Even
though Marty did not even know of Chuck's existence (and, prior to
Marty's death, vice-versa), Chuck could take some of Marty's estate.
DNA testing invites the potentially disruptive consequences of such a
sequence of events. Grieving family members may be shocked by these
types of claims. In addition, it slows and confuses the probate process.
Grieving family members might also resist the plaintiff's efforts seeking
to establish paternity by exhuming the decedent's body363 or compelling
the decedent's other family members to submit samples for genetic test-
ing.364 It seems troubling that a non-marital child of whose existence the
decedent was unaware may take to the exclusion of those the decedent
loved and considered family but were not genetically related to the dece-
dent, and further, that such a claim may cause serious disruption and tur-
moil to the decedent's grieving family.
As noted in In the Interest of TSS,365 a Texas case involving a man who
served as a social father to a child for ten years before realizing that he
was not the genetic father, "[a]lthough DNA testing may provide a bright
line for determining the biological relationship between a man and a
child, it does not and cannot define the human relationship between a
father and child."'366
7. Already Outdated and Inflexible
The 2008 UPC Amendments' narrow focus on legal adoption and chil-
dren conceived by ART precludes other common, but untraditional, fam-
ily structures found in the United States. For instance, many individuals
cannot afford marriage, divorce, or legal adoption (or, an individual
might distrust the legal system). 367 Nevertheless, these individuals may
be part of a blended family that raise and treat non-genetic children as
their own.368
363. See, e.g., Batcheldor v. Boyd, 423 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992); Alexander v.
Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1310 (Ohio Pro. Ct. 1988).
364. See, e.g., Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So. 2d 474 (La. 1991); In re Estate
of Rogers, 583 A.2d 782 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); Lach v. Welch, No.
FA930063955, 1997 WL 536330 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 1997).
365. 61 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. 2002).
366. Id. at 485 n.4 (quoting Stithain v. Henderson, 768 A.2d 598, 605 (Me. 2001).
367. These individuals might be more likely than others to die intestate, but are over-
looked in intestacy statutes.
368. For example, a couple might not be able to afford a divorce. The wife could leave
the husband with their infant children and begin another relationship with her new partner
who would also raise and support the wife's children. Or, a wife might have an affair and
become pregnant. The genetic father of the child may not relinquish parental rights, but
the wife's husband may nevertheless raise and support the child as his own. It goes without
saying that there are many examples of non-traditional family structures that are ignored
by the language of the new statutes. See also Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple
Fathers, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 231, 236 (2007) (describing how male parenting patterns
differ from female patterns, including how men parent "serially" based on the person with
whom they share their household).
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In addition to ignoring some common parent-child relationships, be-
cause the 2008 Amendments are so tightly drafted and state legislatures
are so slow to enact legislation, the new UPC may become more outdated
before it even becomes law. The more factors added to any legal rubric
dealing with an area of law involving frequent and rapid technological
advancement, the more brittle the rubric becomes. Specific and explicit
multi-faceted tests in a field involving ever-shifting technological vari-
ables break easily when technology evolves. A brittle rubric is doomed to
quickly shatter and to become obsolete.
The corollary to this is that the simpler the legal rubric used to deal
with an area of the law involving quickly evolving technology, the more
flexible the rubric is. A flexible rubric is easily adaptable to changing
technology and can withstand the test of time.
The kitchen sink approach adopted by the 2008 UPC Amendments is
as brittle as a glass swizzle stick. It involves a complicated and lengthy
analysis to determine who is a child of whom and includes many codified
variables that are inextricably linked to the development of ART. As
ART is constantly evolving, the codified variables will fast become
antiquated. 369
The unadulterated functionally based approach is as flexible as a reed.
It involves a simple and workable test that, if adopted tomorrow, would
continue to fulfill its purpose regardless of advances in ART or the
changing nature of family structures.
E. GENETIC MAPPING AND THE DUTY TO TEST
Because sophisticated DNA tests now make it possible to prove or dis-
prove paternity with a very high degree of reliability, 370 the sanguinary
nexus test may produce disharmonious outcomes for surviving family
members. In light of the fact that four percent of men are raising children
that they mistakenly believe to be their own but that they did not in fact
genetically father, 371 strict adherence to the sanguinary nexus test could
produce harsh results for some surviving family members. The offshoot is
that by continuing with a blood-based approach to intestacy, it becomes
hard to argue that there is not a fiduciary duty to perform DNA testing
prior to distribution, especially as a DNA test can be performed quickly
and cheaply. The test could be as simple as a cotton-swab rubbed on the
inside of the supposed father's cheek.
369. See Knaplund, supra note 294, at 99 (discussing technology, such as artificial
wombs and frozen stem cells, that can be used to produce eggs or sperms and cloning).
370. See David H. Kaye, DNA Paternity Probabilities, 24 FAM. L.Q. 279, 292-304 (1990)
[hereinafter Kaye, DNA Paternity]; David H. Kaye, Presumptions, Probability and Pater-
nity, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 323, 337-42 (1990) [hereinafter Kaye, Presumptions, Probability
and Paternity]; JEFFREY W. MORRIS & DAVID W. GJERTSON, THE SCIENTIFIC STATUS OF
PARENTAGE TESTING, in MODERN Sci. EVIDENCE § 19-2.0 (David L. Faigman et al. eds.,
1997).
371. See Sam Lister, It's a Very Testing Time for Fathers, THE TIMES, Aug. 11, 2005, at 3.
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If succession law is supposed to further donative intent and succession
law relies upon blood to define child status, it can be assumed that only
distributions to blood relatives fulfills donative intent. Therefore, if the
decedent's general intent, whether in a will or through an intestacy stat-
ute, is that the decedent's property pass to his or her genetic children,
then there might be a fiduciary duty to DNA test before a child takes his
or her share of the decedent's estate. Indeed, in the face of the new tech-
nology and the data it reveals, any argument against requiring DNA test-
ing in a blood-based approach (either because of fear of what it might
show or because of a rejection of its importance) would implicitly adopt
this Article's hypothesis-the reason testing is unnecessary is because a
functionally based relationship trumps.
VII. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF UNADULTERATED
FUNCTIONALLY BASED APPROACH
The strengths that make an unadulterated functionally based analysis
so appealing may also cause some concern. Because each relationship is
analyzed individually, the approach may be too administratively ineffi-
cient to be implemented. In addition, individuals will be subject to the
discretionary decision making of judges, who can never be free of their
own biases. Finally, because some illegitimate children would not inherit
from their genetic parents, an equal protection issue potentially exists.
Because these concerns affect whether the unadulterated functionally
based approach may actually be feasible to implement, they deserve to be
explored.
A. INEFFICIENCY
One potential criticism of this Article's proposal is the administrative
difficulty inherent in an individualized functionally based approach to
parenthood for inheritance purposes.372 To be fair, there is some validity
in this sentiment: as a default approximation, it is important for intestacy
law to be predictable and administratively simple.373 An unadulterated
372. In some jurisdictions, inefficiencies of the current probate court system make a
functional-based test administratively difficult and cause less-predictable outcomes. In
fact, probate judges in some jurisdictions are elected to their offices and may not have
prior legal experience or training. See, e.g., Prof. John H. Langbein, Statement to the Con-
necticut Legislature Committee: "The Scandal of Connecticut's Probate Courts" (Oct. 11,
2005), http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/1766.htm (noting that Connecticut probate judges
often lack legal experience and have not been trained to serve as judges); Thomas E. Gaf-
fey, Probate Reform in Connecticut A Historical Perspective, 78 CONN. BAR J. 65, 87 (2004)
(criticizing the efficiency of the Connecticut probate court system). In scenarios such as
this, probate courts may well be unequipped to impartially and efficiently analyze estates
using a functional-based approach. Perusing the academic literature, however, the problem
of elected, non-lawyer judges seems to be limited to only a few states. Assuming arguendo
that some probate judges lack the training to apply tests other than the sanguinary-nexus
test, the newest UPC amendments present an identical problem of redefining family rela-
tionships for inheritance purposes, albeit using an even more complex set of new rules.
373. See E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to Intestate Inheritance
Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 OR. L. REV. 255, 284-85 (2002); Gary, supra
note 52, at 651-53.
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functionally based approach could introduce some uncertainty into suc-
cession law because of the discretion such an approach affords to the
court to determine who is and who is not a child.
For efficiency purposes, and because most children would fall into the
blood or adopted category, I would propose a rebuttable presumption of
a parent-child relationship in cases of genetic children and adopted chil-
dren. This presumption could be overcome where there is no functional
relationship. Potential exclusion for lack of a genetic tie or adoption
could be overcome by a functional showing.
Still, there are reasons why an efficiency concern is not prohibitive to
this Article's proposal. First, the 2008 UPC Amendments incorporate
functionalism, and courts will already have to decide these matters. Un-
adulterated functionalism would simply expand this class.
Another reason not to overemphasize the administrative difficulty in a
functionally based test for parenthood is that such a test is not much dif-
ferent from the factor-driven analysis courts already routinely use in the
equitable adoption context. 37 4 Although the contract-based equitable
adoption analysis is in many respects quite different from the proposal
espoused in this Article, the two contexts are similar in one critical re-
spect: both look to a series of factors that extend beyond mere love and
affection for the purpose of determining parenthood for distribution
through intestacy. 375 Indeed, while courts have recognized the adminis-
trative task of using a series of factors to determine parenthood by equi-
table adoption376 and for that very reason they have been reluctant to
extend the concept of equitable adoption beyond its intestacy roots, they
have continually been willing to undertake the individualized analysis in-
herent in the equitable adoption issue with respect to intestacy.377
In addition, even to the extent that a functionally based approach is
more administratively complex than the current approach, it nonetheless
remains more administratively simple than a proper blood-based ap-
proach. As noted, progressing technology has had a profound effect on
the prevalence and accuracy of genetic testing.378 To the extent that a
continuing blood-based approach would require at least some level of
DNA testing, the functionally based approach in this Article is not only
374. See generally Robinson, supra note 85 (discussing the concept and application of
equitable adoption).
375. See Hall v. Richardson, 362 F. Supp. 662, 667-69 (S.D. Tex 1973) (discussing factors
relevant to equitable adoption determination and noting the requirement of "[miore than
just mutual love and affection...").
376. For a discussion on the doctrine of equitable adoption, see supra Part 11I.C.
377. See Chavez v. Shea, 525 P.2d 1148, 1149, 1151 (Colo. 1974) (acknowledging a rec-
ognition of equitable estoppel in the context of estate succession, but declining to extend
the concept to the context of a statute providing economic assistance based on the pres-
ence of dependent children because a bright-line rule was administratively easier insofar as
"[t]o extend payments further would require individual case determinations as to whether
the applicant had assumed ... some or all of the responsibilities of raising the child" and
"such determinations would have to be in accordance with a set of standards which would
assure uniformity in defining eligibility").
378. Shapiro, supra note 115, at 86-87.
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more closely aligned with approximation of testator intent, but it is also
more administratively simple and predictable. For instance, the intent-
based approach is more consistent with intestacy's goal of predictability.
While it is possible to objectively observe a relationship and apply a num-
ber of factors to determine who is or is not functioning in a parent-child
relationship, it is generally impossible to look at a relationship and deter-
mine if there is a genetic link (a fact confirmed by the percentages
above, 379 detailing the overwhelming number of mistaken fathers). Thus,
because functionalism is more transparent than a blood approach, its re-
sults are more predictable. This is important to the extent it allows indi-
viduals to rely on intestacy as a primary or backup plan for estate
distribution.380
Finally, although no empirical evidence suggests this, I believe that for
the majority of cases there will be no dispute. Any person who would
qualify as a child under the unadulterated functionally based approach
would likewise already contest his or her status under the sanguinary
nexus test. Thus, application of the unadulterated functionally based ap-
proach should not appreciably increase the number of persons contesting
whether they qualify for child status.
B. JUDICIAL BIAS
Although the functionally based approach necessarily relies on the
court's judgment concerning the nature of the decedent's relationship,
such discretion can be cabined so that a high degree of predictability is
achieved. 381 Adhering to the proposed factor test will narrows a court's
discretion. Professor Mary Ann Glendson has discussed how discretion
operates in family law and succession law. 382 She notes:
[G]ranting the necessity for a great deal of judicial discretion in deal-
ing with the economic and child-related effects of divorce, it is im-
portant to recognize that this discretion need not be uncontrolled
and that significant predictability can be introduced into a discretion-
ary system.... [T]he fact that no two family situations are identical
does not mean that there are not regularly recurring fact patterns
that can and should be treated in the same way.383
In addition, courts have been and are capable of recognizing non-tradi-
tional child status. In V.C. v. M.J.B.,384 a custody dispute between former
lesbian partners, the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted that the judicial
system is capable of determining issues regarding parent-child relation-
ships.385 The court stated that:
379. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
380. See Gary, supra note 52, at 653.
381. Spitko, supra note 348, at 1088.
382. Id. (citing Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family
Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165 (1986)).
383. Glendon, supra note 383, at 1170-71.
384. 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000).
385. Id. at 557.
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[W]e should not be misled into thinking that any particular model of
family life is the only one that embodies "family values."..... Those
attributes may be found in biological families, step-families, blended
families, single parent families, foster families, families created by
modern reproductive technology, and in families made up of unmar-
ried persons. . . . Moreover, our judicial system has long acknowl-
edged that "courts are capable of dealing with the realities, not
simply the legalities, of relationships" and have adjusted the rights
and duties of parties in relation to that reality .... [T]he nuclear
family of husband and wife and their offspring is not the only
method by which a parent-child relationship can be created. 38 6
The remaining level of uncertainty is fine in pursuit of the higher goal
of testamentary freedom. 387 In fact, some commentators have noted that
the UPC should subordinate simplicity and certainty in favor of promot-
ing testamentary freedom. 388
C. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF APPROACH
One issue raised by moving to a parentage framework is the potential
discrimination against illegitimate issue in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Constitution. 389 In a line of cases beginning with Levy
v. Louisiana,390 the Supreme Court has invalidated statutes that treat ille-
gitimate children differently than those born in wedlock. 391 In Levy, the
Court considered whether Louisiana could exclude illegitimate children
from recovering under its wrongful death statute. 392 Applying the ra-
tional basis test, the Court held that the Louisiana court's construction of
the wrongful death statute as denying recovery to illegitimate children
invidiously discriminated against these children for no rational reason. 393
386. Id. at 556.
387. See generally Mark L. Asher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older and Better
and More like the Internal Revenue Code?, 77 MINN. L. REV. 639, 641 (1993)
388. Id. at 640 (Upon his review of the 1990 revisions, Professor Asher concluded that
"[e]ffectuation of a decedent's intent seems to have served as the revisers primary com-
pass." In furtherance of Article II's "need better to effectuate a decedent's intent," the
1990 Code "frequently specifies outcomes that depend explicitly upon the decedent's in-
tention (as opposed to what the controlling document says), which, in turn, is ascertainable
(if at all) only upon analysis of all the facts and circumstances.").
389. The Clause provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
390. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. For a
thorough explication of the Court's decisions in this line of cases, see generally Discrimina-
tion Against Illegitimate Children, 90 HARV. L. REV. 123 (1976).
391. Levy, 391 U.S. at 69.
392. Id. at 69-70.
393. Id. at 72. The Court bolstered its holding with several forceful rhetorical
questions:
When the child's claim of damage for loss of his mother is in issue, why, in
terms of 'equal protection,' should the tortfeasors go free merely because the
child is illegitimate? Why should the illegitimate child be denied rights
merely because of his birth out of wedlock? He certainly is subject to all the
responsibilities of a citizen, including the payment of taxes and conscription
under the Selective Service Act. How under our constitutional regime can
he be denied correlative rights which other citizens enjoy?
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In reaching its holding, the Court noted that
the mother ... gave birth to [the] five illegitimate children and...
they lived with her; that she treated them as a parent would treat any
other child; that she worked as a domestic servant to support them,
taking them to church every Sunday and enrolling them, at her own
expense, in a parochial school.394
The Court concluded by observing that the mother "cared for them and
nurtured them; they were indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual
sense; in her death they suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent
would." 395
By contrast, Labine v. Vincent,396 decided three years later, passed
once again on Louisiana law concerning illegitimate children. 397 In
Labine, an illegitimate, unacknowledged child sought a portion of her fa-
ther's property after he died intestate.398 Distinguishing Levy, the Court
held that Louisiana's statutory scheme, which did not permit unacknowl-
edged, illegitimate children to inherit through intestate succession, did
not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses. 399 In reaching
this decision, the Court accepted Louisiana's interest in the orderly ad-
ministration of intestate succession as a rational basis for the discrimina-
tory treatment. 400  The Court noted that if the decedent had
acknowledged his illegitimate daughter during his lifetime, then she
would have been a "natural child" under the state's intestacy scheme and
would have inherited from his estate.401
To further complicate matters, Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 40 2
reached a conclusion similar to Levy with regard to workers' compensa-
tion claims.40 3 Addressing the question of whether "dependent unac-
knowledged, illegitimate children" could recover "on an equal footing"
with dependent legitimate children, the Court held that a "denial of equal
Id. at 71.
394. Id. at 70.
395. Id. at 72.
396. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
397. Id. at 533.
398. Id. at 533-34.
399. Id. at 535-36.
400. Id. at 536-37.
401. Id. at 537. At the close of its opinion, the Court explained:
We emphasize that this is not a case, like Levy, where the State has created
an insurmountable barrier to this illegitimate child. There is not the slightest
suggestion in this case that Louisiana has barred this illegitimate from inher-
iting from her father. Ezra Vincent could have left one-third of his property
to his illegitimate daughter had he bothered to follow the simple formalities
of executing a will. He could, of course, have legitimated the child by mar-
rying her mother in which case the child could have inherited his property
either by intestate succession or by will as any other legitimate child. Finally,
he could have awarded his child the benefit of Louisiana's intestate succes-
sion statute on the same terms as legitimate children simply by stating in his
acknowledgment of paternity his desire to legitimate the little girl.
Id. at 539.
402. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
403. Id. at 176.
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recovery rights to dependent unacknowledged illegitimate" children vio-
lated the equal protection guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment. 404
Employing an intermediate level of scrutiny, 40 5 the Court did not find a
"significant relationship" between Louisiana's avowed interests in en-
couraging "legitimate family relationships" and the "recognized purposes
of recovery which work[ers'] compensation statutes commendably serve"
with discrimination against illegitimate children in the payment of work-
ers' compensation benefits.40 6 In outlining the facts, Justice Powell com-
mented on the close parent-child relationship between the deceased
father and the illegitimate children:
[T]he dependency and natural affinity of the unacknowledged illegit-
imate children for their father were as great as those of the four legit-
imate children whom Louisiana has allowed to recover. The
legitimate children and the illegitimate children all lived in the home
of the deceased and were equally dependent upon him for mainte-
nance and support. 40 7
A pattern emerges in the Court's characterization of the parent-child
relationship in Levy and Weber-the closeness of the illegitimate children
to the parent and the equal footing that these children enjoyed with their
legitimate siblings was important enough for the Court to consider in sup-
port of its decisions.
Finally, one further case illustrates this pattern. In Trimble v.
Gordon,40 8 the Court invalidated an Illinois intestacy statute limiting in-
heritance by intestate succession to illegitimate children of the mother.40 9
Once again, the Court noted the irrationality of any scheme that treated
illegitimate and legitimate dependents differently:
It may perhaps be said that statutory distinctions between the legiti-
mate and illegitimate reflect closer family relationships in that the
illegitimate is more often not under care in the home of the father
nor even supported by him. The illegitimate, so this argument runs,
may thus be made less eligible for the statutory recoveries and inher-
itances reserved for those more likely to be within the ambit of fa-
milial care and affection. Whatever the merits elsewhere of this
contention, it is not compelling in a statutory compensation scheme
where dependency on the deceased is a prerequisite to anyone's re-
404. Id. at 165.
405. Id. at 172-73. For a discussion of the contours of this intermediate level of scrutiny,
see generally Intermediate Standard of Review, 91 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1977). In Weber,
Justice Rehnquist dissented, criticizing the majority for "expand[ing] the traditional 'rea-
sonable basis' standard ... into a search for 'legitimate' state interests that the legislation
may 'promote' ... [and thus] doing nothing less than passing policy judgments upon the
acts of every state legislature in the country." Weber, 406 U.S. at 185 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
406. Id. at 175 (majority opinion).
407. Id. at 169-70 (footnote omitted).
408. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). Justice Powell also authored the majority opinion in Trimble.
Id.
409. Id. at 776. Justice Rehnquist also dissented for similar reasons in Trimble. See id.
at 777 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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covery, and where the acknowledgment so necessary to equal recov-
ery rights may be unlikely to occur or legally impossible to effectuate
even where the illegitimate child may be nourished and loved. 410
The Court also expressed its disapproval of meting out "society's con-
demnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage" on
"the head of an infant. '411 The Court concluded that such an approach
was not justified "by a legitimate state interest, compelling or
otherwise." 41 2
In its next term, in Lalli v. Lalli,413 a plurality of the Court receded
somewhat from Trimble. Confronted with a New York statute that re-
quired the entry of a court order during a father's lifetime in order for
illegitimate children of the father to inherit by intestacy, the Court held
that such a statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.414 The
Court distinguished its holding in Trimble on the grounds that the statute
in Trimble had required marriage of the parents in order for illegitimate
children to inherit property through intestate succession.415 Because the
New York statute in Lalli afforded alternatives to marriage, the plurality
opinion found no constitutional violation.41 6
Almost a decade later, in Reed v. Campbell,417 the Court made clear
that the decision in Trimble applied to cases pending at the time Trimble
was decided.418 The Reed Court reversed a Texas Supreme Court deci-
sion that prevented recovery by illegitimate children who brought their
claims for a share in the decedent's intestacy proceedings after Trim-
ble.419 The Court held that the state had no legitimate interest in denying
intestate succession after Trimble on the basis of when claims were
filed.420 In reaching this decision, the Court clarified that Trimble was
still good law. 421
410. Weber, 406 U.S. at 173-74.
411. Id. at 175.
412. Id. at 176.
413. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
414. Id. at 266-67, 276.
415. Id. at 266.
416. Id. at 273, 276.
417. 476 U.S. 852 (1986).
418. Id. at 853.
419. Id. at 855-56.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 854. The Court explained that:
Although the question presented in this case is framed in terms of "retroac-
tivity," its answer is governed by a rather clear distinction that has emerged
from our cases considering the constitutionality of statutory provisions that
impose special burdens on illegitimate children. In these cases, we have
unambiguously concluded that a State may not justify discriminatory treat-
ment of illegitimates in order to express its disapproval of their parents' mis-
conduct. We have, however, also recognized that there is a permissible basis
for some "distinctions made in part on the basis of legitimacy"; specifically,
we have upheld statutory provisions that have an evident and substantial re-
lation to the State's interest in providing for the orderly and just distribution
of a decedent's property at death.
Id. at 854-55 (citations and footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 62
HeinOnline  -- 62 S.M.U. L. Rev. 428 2009
Parent-Child Property Succession
The lesson from this line of cases is clear-a state may not treat chil-
dren differently merely on the basis of their legitimacy. Accordingly,
adopting a functionally based approach for estates law should not run
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause because the legitimacy of children
would not be a factor in determining whether a parent-child relationship
existed. Under such a model, both legitimate and illegitimate children
could be deemed part of a parent-child relationship. Similarly, both legit-
imate and illegitimate children could fall outside of this relationship. The
result under a functionally based approach would turn not on legitimacy,
but rather on many of the factors that Justice Powell eloquently articu-
lated in Levy and Weber, namely the substance of the parent-child
relationship.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The diversity of family relationships extant in American life, emerging
forms of ART, and advances in genetic testing have influenced the defini-
tion of "parentage" in law and society. These influences have dramati-
cally diminished the importance of a genetic link in determining parent-
child relationships, yet succession law continues its blind devotion to the
sanguinary nexus test. Completely breaking the genetic link is necessary,
however, though because it no longer has a function in modern estates
law. As Professor Mann has opined, "[wihen the categories of the past
can no longer accommodate the present, they must eventually change or
be abandoned. '422
The sanguinary nexus test for defining child status should be replaced
by an unadulterated functionally based approach, inquiring into the exis-
tence, or lack thereof, of a parent-child relationship as the sole means for
determining child status for inheritance laws. A shift away from the
child-centered theology of family law to the more appropriate property
owner centered view of estates law jurisprudence is long overdue. The
proposal herein relies heavily on the law governing donative intent, prop-
erty rights, and some implicit assumptions about parentage. In addition,
it promotes coherent rules reliant on consistent, rather than discordant,
values. Also, the approach has the additional advantage of comprehen-
siveness and flexibility-it can currently be applied to the full range of
legal issues associated with parentage for inheritance purposes and
evolves along with the changing nature of parent-child relationships and
the methods of child creation. Finally, the unadulterated functionally
based approach would ensure consistency in our treatment of property
owners and would focus attention on property rights and the intent of the
property owners, rather than family law policy and technological novelty.
422. See Foster, supra note 11, at 240 (quoting Bruce H. Mann, Essay: Formalities and
Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1050 (1994)).
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